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Executive Summary
The protracted economic and political crisis in Zimbabwe led directly to a major increase in mixed
migration flows to South Africa. Migrants were drawn from every sector of society, all education and
skill levels, equal numbers of both sexes, and all ages (including unaccompanied child migration).
Many migrants claimed asylum in South Africa which gave them the right to work while they waited for
a refugee hearing. Many others were arrested and deported back to Zimbabwe. Migrants who were
unable to find employment in the formal economy turned to employment and self-employment in the
informal economy. These migrant entrepreneurs used personal savings to establish small and micro
enterprises in many urban areas. The businesses focused on retail trading, manufacturing and
services and contributed to the South African economy in various ways, including providing
employment for South Africans.
Nationwide xenophobic violence in 2008 targeted all migrants, irrespective of origin and legal status.
From 2008 onwards, violent attacks on migrant-owned informal businesses began to escalate. This
culminated in a second round of nationwide xenophobic violence in early 2015 when migrant-owned
businesses were targeted by mobs. Migrants send essential remittances to family in Zimbabwe and
return migration is not a viable or long-term response until Zimbabwe’s economic crisis is resolved. As
a result, informal migrant entrepreneurs have adapted to hostile business conditions by adopting a
range of strategies to avoid and protect themselves and their businesses from xenophobia.
Against this backdrop, this report first discusses the nature of the crisis in Zimbabwe and its
connections with large-scale out-migration, particularly to South Africa. The South African response to
crisis-driven migration is reviewed showing how the government shifted from a predominantly coercive
and control-oriented policy towards a more realistic assessment of the need to accommodate migrants
through an immigration amnesty and the right to work in the formal and informal sector. One of the
major challenges facing migrants and all stakeholders in South Africa is xenophobic violence.
Nationwide attacks on migrants and refugees in 2008 and 2015 have been interspersed with ongoing
lower-level episodes of violence. These attacks have increasingly targeted migrants and refugees,
including many Zimbabweans, seeking to make a living in the country’s urban informal economy.
The research for this report focused on the business activities and responses to xenophobic violence
of Zimbabweans in the informal economy. Amongst the key findings were the following:










Between 20-30% of Zimbabwean migrants in South African cities are involved in the informal
economy and the importance of informal sector employment to Zimbabweans has increased
over time.
Zimbabweans operating enterprises in the informal economy are predominantly young (5075% under the age of 35) and male (60-70%)
Nearly two-thirds of the migrant entrepreneurs arrived in South Africa in the peak years of the
Zimbabwean crisis between 2000 and 2010 (42%). Another 32% migrated after 2010. Less
than 2% migrated to South Africa before the end of apartheid.
Economic hardship, unemployment and political persecution are the main push drivers of
migration to South Africa. Pull drivers include the assistance of relatives already in South
Africa and the prospect of employment.
The majority of the Zimbabwean migrant enterprises are in the retail, trade and wholesale
sector, followed by services and manufacturing. Around three-quarters of the migrants relied
on their personal savings to start their businesses and many worked in the formal economy
first.
Business expansion has occurred despite the prime obligation of the entrepreneurs to
support family still in Zimbabwe. Instead of reinvesting all of the business profits into further
expansion, a portion is therefore diverted into remittance channels. Over one-third remit
funds at least once per month and only 12% never send remittances.
A significant number of the entrepreneurs had been victims of or knew other who had been
victims of crime such as looting and robbery, xenophobic abuse and police misconduct
abuse.

ix

The report then presents the results of in-depth interviews with Zimbabwean business-owners who had
experienced xenophobic violence in 2008 and 2015 or at other times. The narratives of the migrants
provide insights into the unpredictable nature of the violence, their vulnerability to attack, the loss of
business goods and property during mob violence and the need to restart from scratch, and the
various strategies that they adopt to reduce risk. These strategies include operating in safer areas (not
feasible for all), avoiding areas where corrupt police tend to operate, paying for protection and flight
when xenophobic violence erupts. Return to Zimbabwe is not considered a viable option because of
the economic conditions there.
The interviews also provide insights into the migrants’ perceptions of government and stakeholder
responses to the xenophobic violence. Almost without exception, the migrants felt that neither
government (the Zimbabwean or South African) had done anything to protect or assist them during and
after the violence. This perception of inaction also extended to international and non-governmental
organisations. The migrants were particularly harsh in their comments about the police who were
widely seen as either conniving in the violence or uninterested in protecting migrants.
The perceptions of the migrants that nothing is done may simply be a function of who was interviewed
and does not necessarily reflect the actual reality. The report therefore evaluates the response of the
South African government to the ongoing crisis of xenophobia and concludes that some actions – such
as sending in the army – are taken during episodes of nationwide violence but that ongoing daily and
weekly attacks are generally ignored. There is a strong official line that these attacks are not motivated
by xenophobia and. Indeed, that xenophobia does not even exist. This is clearly contradicted by the
migrants who view the attacks as motivated by xenophobia. A second element of the official response
is that the migrants are partially to blame for what happens to them as their business success builds
resentment amongst South Africans. Government has yet to acknowledge that migrant-owned informal
enterprises make a valuable contribution to the economy of the country, including through job creation
for South Africans. The primary response to the violence of 2015 was the launching of a military-style
Operation Fiela which was justified as a crime-fighting initiative but appears to have targeted migrant
enterprises.
The final sections of the report examine the responses and programmes of various non-governmental
and international organisations to the crisis of xenophobia. During large-scale xenophobic violence
there is considerable mobilisation of anti-xenophobia civil society organisations to offer protection and
protest. Their effectiveness and impact tends to dissipate when the violence is more scattered and
random. The South African Human Rights Commission (SAHRC) has played a major role in the past in
holding government to account and articulating extensive recommendations for remedial action, most
of which have not been taken up and many of which are still highly relevant. International organisations
have tended to target integration and education programming at the community level but there has
only been one systematic evaluation (of the UNHCR’s response) which was highly critical of the
organisation. These organisations and other governments are considerably hamstrung by xenophobia
denialism at the highest level because it means that government will avoid the kinds of partnership that
are urgently needed to address this endemic crisis.
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“It is a problem, but I would never define it as a crisis”
(Charles Nqakula, South Africa’s Safety and Security Minister, 2008)
“They are very xenophobic – they are the owners of xenophobia”
(Zimbabwean Migrant, Cape Town, 2016)
“Our country will one day be stable and we will go back. Tomorrow it might be them in a crisis and
when they come to us, people will hold on to that grudge. So if they treat us well, we will also”
(Zimbabwean Migrant, Johannesburg, 2016)

1. Introduction
In 2015, the European Union (EU) launched ‘Migrants in Countries in Crisis: Supporting an
Evidence-based Approach for Effective and Cooperative State Action’, a four-year project
implemented by the International Centre for Migration Policy Development (ICMPD). This EUfunded project is a contribution to the global Migrants in Countries in Crisis (MICIC) initiative, a
government-led process co-chaired by the governments of the Philippines and the United States,
which shares similar goals. The project aims to improve the capacity of states and other
stakeholders to assist and provide protection to migrants who find themselves in countries
affected by crisis, as well as address the long-term implications of such situations. Within the
project, six regional consultations with states and other relevant stakeholders have been
conducted, contributing to the development of the MICIC initiative ‘Guidelines to protect migrants
1
in countries experiencing conflict or natural disaster’ , which provide guidance for states and
other stakeholders in responding to the needs of migrants caught in crisis situations. In addition,
the project also develops capacity building activities to follow up on key recommendations that
2
have emerged over the course of the project. This case study report presents the results of one
3
case study among six of the Research Component of the EU-funded MICIC project, whose goal
is to complement these efforts by providing policy-relevant analysis of the implications of crises in
host countries.
Humanitarian emergencies involving human migration are generally perceived to be of a singular,
unidimensional character, affecting one of two categories of migrant: either those forced to leave
their home countries by crisis conditions or those living in another country affected by a crisis.
Most attention has been given to the first category and the precarious circumstances of those
displaced to other countries by political, economic and social conditions in their countries of
4
origin. Indeed, the global humanitarian regime is based on principles of protection and
assistance for those forcibly displaced by political events, violent conflict and individual
5
persecution. The second category are migrants who have been trapped by unexpectedly volatile
and dangerous situations in countries of destination, including natural disasters, civil conflict or
anti-migrant intolerance. The term “migration in countries in crisis” is usually taken to refer to the
6
plight of these migrants caught up in an unexpected crisis situation in a “host country”.
1

Migrants in Countries in Crisis (MICIC) Initiative. (2016). Guidelines to Protect Migrants in Countries
Experiencing Conflict or Natural Disaster. Retrieved from:
https://micicinitiative.iom.int/sites/default/files/document/MICIC_Guidelines_english_web_13_09_2016.pdf.
2
For more information on the capacity building activities, as well as the regional consultations, see:
http://www.icmpd.org/our-work/migrants-in-countries-in-crisis/.
3
The other case studies under study are: Central African Republic political unrest of 2013-2014; Côte
d’Ivoire political unrest of 2002-2003 and 2010-2011; Libya political unrest of 2011; Lebanon situation of
migrant domestic workers and the 2006 crisis; and Thailand natural disaster of 2011.
4
Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, E., Loescher, G., Long, K., & Sigona, N. (Eds.). (2014). The Oxford handbook of
refugee and forced migration studies. OUP Oxford.
5
Martin, S. F., Weerasinghe, S., & Taylor, A. (2014). Humanitarian crises and migration: Causes,
consequences and responses. Routledge.
6
Koser, K. (2014). “Non-Citizens Caught Up in Situations of Conflict, Violence and Disaster” In S. Martin, S.
Weerasinghe and A. Taylor (eds.), Humanitarian Crises and Migration: Causes, Consequences and
Responses (London: Routledge), pp. 267- 286.

1

Although emergencies affecting migrants are becoming increasingly complex and multifaceted,
the intersection of crisis situations in countries of origin and destination have been given
7
insufficient attention , although referenced in the recently produced MICIC guidelines. A dual or
multiple crisis situation spanning origin and destination presents new, and not easily resolved,
8
challenges for the management of crisis and the safety of displaced migrants. The distinction
9
between refugees and other types of migrant is certainly blurred in such complex circumstances.
Moreover, the intersection of crises affects the kinds of assistance that can be given to migrants
by both sending and receiving governments as well as by humanitarian agencies and other actors.
10
Significant protection gaps also exist for those trapped by a double crisis. For example,
migrants in a country in crisis may not have the option of return migration if crisis conditions in
their country of origin make return unviable. The newly forged vulnerabilities that such complex
11
circumstances generate have not yet been adequately documented or understood. As Martin et
12
al. argue, effective, humane and implementable principles and practices are required to respond
to these types of complex crisis-related movement.
Lindley has examined the relationship between “crisis” and “migration” and shows that both
13
processes are largely viewed as exceptional, aberrant phenomena. While “crisis” circumstances
are seen to occur outside the realm of regular, “normal” development and change, migration is
seen as a threat to the regular order of relationships between state and its citizens. As she notes,
“there is a deep well of sedentarist thinking (which) frames migration as crisis and staying put as
14
the natural and desirable human condition”. In such circumstances, large-scale flows to another
jurisdiction precipitated by crisis conditions are inevitably viewed in a negative light and as placing
a significant strain on host populations. Far from appreciating the crisis-driven nature of these
movements, host populations very often respond with a mixture of anxiety, animosity and
intolerance to the physical presence of migrants who have been forced to flee intolerable
circumstances in their home countries. The result can be the generation of a different set of crisis
conditions for migrants to confront in their country of destination.
In this context, migration from Zimbabwe to South Africa tends to be seen as an atypical,
exceptional, and temporary phenomenon, characterised almost entirely in negative or abnormal
terms. Migration is seen solely as a speedy response to crisis in Zimbabwe, overlooking the many
reasons people leave and the fact that more people stay put than migrate. Longer histories of
migration and previous ties connecting these countries in the past are all forgotten. Also ignored
are the ways in which older patterns of migrations have influenced later ones. On the South
African side, migrants from Zimbabwe are viewed as an unwanted burden, usurping what are
regularly characterised as ‘limited’ or ‘scarce’ resources meant exclusively for citizens.
Exaggerated numbers feed the alarmist view of uncontrolled waves of migrants ‘flooding’ and
‘swamping’ South Africa. The many benefits South Africa and its citizens receive from migrants
7

IOM (2012). Moving to Safety: Migration Consequences of Complex Crises. Background Paper,
International Organization for Migration, Geneva; McAdam, J. (2014). Conceptualizing ‘Crisis Migration’: A
Theoretical Perspective. In S. Martin, S. Weerasinghe and A. Taylor (eds.), Humanitarian Crises and
Migration: Causes, Consequences and Responses (London: Routledge), pp. 28-50.
8
Hendow, M., Pailey, R. and Bravi, A. (2016). Migrants in Countries in Crisis: Emerging Findings, A
Comparative Study of Six Crisis Situations. International Centre for Migration Policy Development, Vienna;
Perching, B. (2016). Actor and Stakeholder Involvement in Crisis Mitigation. MICIC Research Brief,
International Centre for Migration Policy Development, Vienna.
9
Betts, A. (2013). Survival Migration: Failed Governance and the Crisis of Displacement (Ithaca, NY: Cornell
University Press).
10
Betts, A. (2014). The Global Governance of Crisis Migration. In S. Martin, S. Weerasinghe and A. Taylor
(eds.), Humanitarian Crises and Migration: Causes, Consequences and Responses (London: Routledge), pp.
349-367.
11
Pailey, R. (2016). Long-term Socio-Economic Implications of ‘Crisis-Induced’ Migration on Countries of
Origin. MICIC Research Brief, International Centre for Migration Policy Development, Vienna.
12
Martin, S. F., Weerasinghe, S., & Taylor, A. (2014).
13
Lindley, A. (2014). Exploring Crisis and Migration: Concepts and Issues. In A. Lindley (ed.), Crisis and
Migration: Critical Perspectives (London: Routledge), pp. 1-23.
14
Lindley, A. (2014).
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through skills acquisition and job creation are forgotten. However, the ‘plight’ of Zimbabweans in
South Africa represents a very different scenario since most are only there in the first place
because of an enduring crisis at home. This is therefore a case study of a double bind where
migrants are caught up in crises (albeit of different kinds) in both countries simultaneously.
Zimbabwean migrants in South Africa have therefore been forced to navigate not a singular
emergency at a particular location, but two protracted crises occurring concurrently. While these
two crises have unfolded in neighbouring states, their decisive moments or turning points have
similar timeframes, suggesting a direct association between them. It is the simultaneity and
intersectionality of these two crises, the actual and perceived relationships between them, their
multi-sited nature, and the transnational governance of migration by two separate states that
need to be taken into account. By intersectionality, we refer to the manner in which these two
crises are linked and the combined effects they produce for the management of xenophobic
violence in the country of destination, South Africa. Given the specific set of crisis circumstances,
and their protracted nature, a linear, straightforward sequence of humanitarian assistance and
effective management from pre-crisis and post-emergency stages is unsettled.
One crisis involves the political turmoil and economic meltdown in Zimbabwe after 2000, which
has driven hundreds of thousands of citizens to seek a less precarious existence for themselves
15
and their families by migrating to other countries. As a politically stable and economically robust
neighbouring state, with low transaction costs for migration, South Africa has become an
attractive destination for many crisis-driven migrants. Yet far from providing a safe space for
refuge and rebuilding, South Africans have responded with increasing prejudice to the presence
of Zimbabwean migrants.
The other protracted and simultaneous crisis is therefore the xenophobic intolerance and violence
in South Africa in which Zimbabwean migrants have become enmeshed. Xenophobia is not
simply a response to migration from Zimbabwe, however, but part of a more general postapartheid response to the opening up of South Africa to migrants from the rest of Africa and
16
further afield. The targets of xenophobia and xenophobic violence are all foreign migrants and
refugees, although the particular circumstances of migration from Zimbabwe have done little to
insulate or protect Zimbabwean migrants. Zimbabwean migrants in South Africa who fled political
violence and/or the desperate economic circumstances in their country of origin, have faced the
daunting challenge of securing employment and re-building their lives in South Africa, while
continuing to face routine challenges of discrimination, social exclusion, xenophobic harassment
17
and violence.
Whether opposition to immigration, negative attitudes towards and stereotyping of migrants, and
restrictive policies constitute a ‘crisis’ is certainly debatable, for much of the world would then fall
into this category. In a world of sovereign states, most would defend the right of the South African
government to decide what kind of migration policy it wishes to follow and understand why South
Africans might resent migrants whom they feel, however mistakenly, are depriving them of their
entitlements as citizens. At the same time, South Africa is often singled out as a uniquely
xenophobic society, or as the migrant quoted in the epigraph observed, South Africans are “the
owners of xenophobia.” Researchers have attached various labels to South African xenophobia

15

Crush, J. & Tevera, D. (eds.). Zimbabwe’s Exodus: Crisis, Migration, Survival (Ottawa: IDRC).
Crush, J. and Ramachandran, S. (2014). Xenophobic Violence in South Africa: Denialism, Minimalism,
Realism. SAMP Migration Policy Series No 66, Cape Town and Waterloo.
17
Hungwe, C. and Gelderblom, D. (2014). Understanding the Social Exclusion of Zimbabwean Migrants in
Johannesburg, South Africa. Journal of Community Positive Practices 14: 75-91; Idemudia, E., Williams, J.
and Wyatt, G. (2013). Migration Challenges Among Zimbabwean Refugees Before, During and Post Arrival
in South Africa. Journal of Injury and Violence Resolution 5: 17-27; Manik, S. (2014). `We are Working Hand
to Mouth’: Zimbabwean Teachers’ Experiences of Vulnerability in South Africa. Migration and Ethnic
Themes 30: 171-191; Muzondidya, J. (2010). Makwerekwere: Migration, Citizenship and Identity Among
Zimbabweans in South Africa. In J. McGregor and R. Primorac (eds.) Zimbabwe’s New Diaspora:
Displacement and the Cultural Politics of Survival (New York and Oxford: Berghahn Books), pp. 37-58.
16

3

including “the politics of fear”, “a new pathology”, “the dark side of democracy”, “apartheid vertigo”,
18
“the demons within” and “new racism”.
Rather than seeing South Africa as exceptional or as an aberration, however, it would be more
fruitful to view it as one point on a spectrum of intolerance and as offering salutary lessons for
other jurisdictions – both on the drivers of xenophobia and how to respond to its malevolent
effects. The main reason is that xenophobia is on the rise in both the global North and South and
if its general and specific causes are not understood, recognised and addressed, then it has the
19
potential to escalate into the kind of violence regularly witnessed in South Africa.
The crisis of xenophobia in South Africa is defined by discrimination and intolerance to which
migrants are exposed on a daily basis, which assumes an acute, volatile and violent form at
particular moments. Recurrent episodes of xenophobic violence represent ‘tipping points’ or
intense moments in the general ongoing crisis of xenophobia. In this report, we therefore propose
a distinction between routine and extreme forms of xenophobia. Routine xenophobia manifests
itself in negative stereotyping, exclusionary language, verbal denigration, denial of access to
services such as health and education, and insistent demands from citizens that government rid
their communities and the country of ‘foreigners’.
But the nub of the crisis of xenophobia in South Africa is when feelings of hostility and intolerance
manifest as extreme xenophobia which Crush and Ramachandran define as “a heightened form
of xenophobia in which hostility and opposition to those perceived as outsiders and foreigners is
strongly embedded and expressed through aggressive acts directed at migrants and refugees
20
(and) recurrent episodes of violence. Recent national surveys of South African citizens by the
Southern African Migration Programme (SAMP) found that a significant minority were willing to
resort to violence against migrants. As many as a quarter said it was likely or very likely that they
would take action to prevent migrants moving into or opening a business in their home area, and
21
one in ten that they were likely to use violence against migrants in their community.
The deadliest examples of extreme xenophobia in South Africa to date were high-profile and
widespread violence against migrants and refugees in May 2008 and March 2015. The nature
and impacts of the 2008 crisis are now well-documented, although there remain differences of
22
opinion about its causes. For all its strengths, the literature on May 2008 tends to treat the
18
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victims of xenophobic violence in rather undifferentiated fashion, leading to the assumption that
all migrants – irrespective of national origin, legal status, length of time in the country and
livelihood activity – were equally at risk. Yet, attitudinal surveys clearly show that South Africans
differentiate between migrants of different national origin and that Zimbabweans are amongst the
23
most disliked by South Africans. Discussions of May 2008 also do not differentiate sufficiently
between the types of targets that were attacked. For example, many African migrants and
refugees operated small businesses in the informal economy of affected urban areas and these
enterprises came under sustained attack during the wave of violence. In 2015, one of the explicit
targets of the xenophobic attacks were informal businesses run by migrants and refugees.
As this report demonstrates, violent attacks on migrant and refugee entrepreneurs and their
businesses have certainly not been confined to acute episodes of extreme xenophobia such as in
24
May 2008 and March 2015. Ongoing acts of extreme xenophobia have increasingly manifested
in the form of collective violence targeted at migrant- and refugee-owned businesses. We refer to
this phenomenon as chronic extreme xenophobia and a situation of continuous low-level crisis.
The frequency and ferocity of such attacks have increased over time. The chronic form of
extreme xenophobia has prompted various responses and remedial actions by migrants and
refugees including paying protection money to the police, local authorities and taxi associations;
beefing up personal and business security; arming in self-defence; avoiding neighbourhoods and
public spaces known to be particularly dangerous; and moving away from the major cities in
25
search of safer and less contested business environments in smaller urban centres.
The focus of this report is an important sub-group of Zimbabwean migrants in South Africa: that is,
those who earn their livelihoods through informal entrepreneurship in urban spaces. The primary
rationale for choosing this sub-group is that both acute and chronic forms of extreme xenophobia
have increasingly manifested in the form of violence against this group of migrants.
Zimbabweans are not the only small business-owners who have become victims of acute and
chronic extreme xenophobia in South Africa: attacks on migrants and refugees from other
26
countries are also well documented. However, there have been no studies to date specifically
examining the case of migrant entrepreneurs from Zimbabwe trying to make a living in the South
African informal economy.
This report is therefore a contribution to our understanding of the crisis of xenophobia in South
Africa focused on a group of migrants who are an integral part of two other groups: Zimbabwean
migrants as a whole and migrant and refugee entrepreneurs in general. It is also a contribution to
the general literature on migrants in countries in crisis in a situation of intersectionality where
migrants are in a double bind, forced to navigate a state of crisis in both the country of origin and
the country of destination.
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2. Research Methodology
The research for this report focused on a number of key, inter-related questions with a particular
focus on the relationship between the double crisis and informal entrepreneurship by
Zimbabwean migrants in the informal economy of South African cities:






The nature of Zimbabwean participation in the South African informal economy including
entrepreneurial motivations (survivalist or opportunity-driven), types of activities, business
strategies and challenges, and contributions to the South African economy;
The experiences of xenophobic attitudes, behaviours and violence of Zimbabwean
migrant entrepreneurs in South Africa and the impact of xenophobia on their businesses
and livelihoods;
The business strategies adopted by Zimbabwean entrepreneurs to minimise their
vulnerability to xenophobic violence and their responses when actually caught up in
collective attacks.
The response of the two governments to xenophobic violence targeting the informal
economy and what strategies, if any, they have put in place to mitigate the situation of
migrants whose businesses have been plundered or destroyed.
The response of other stakeholders, including NGOs, CSOs, international organisations
and migrant associations to xenophobic violence affecting migrants in the informal
economy and the effectiveness of these responses.

In addition to a comprehensive review of the existing secondary and grey literature relevant to
this topic, the research undertaken for this report included the following:






Documentary research including review of all commissions of enquiry, independent
reports, official press statements, and media reporting on xenophobic violence covering
the period 2008 to 2016;
SAMP surveys of migrant enterprises in the informal economy conducted in Cape Town
and Johannesburg in 2015. This survey captured a random sample of over 1,000
migrant-owned businesses, of which 304 were run by migrants from Zimbabwe. For the
purposes of this report, we extracted a database of the subset of Zimbabweans which
amounted to 186 in Johannesburg and 118 in Cape Town. The informal enterprises had
to meet three basic criteria for inclusion in the study: (a) owned by a Zimbabwean; (b) in
operation for at least two years; and (c) unregistered with the South African Revenue
Services (SARS).
In-depth interviews were conducted with 46 Zimbabwean informal entrepreneurs in mid2016 who were operating businesses in Johannesburg (18), Cape Town (19) and
Polokwane (9) (Annex A);
A total of 30 key informant interviews were undertaken in Cape Town, Johannesburg,
Polowane and Harare with representatives of NGOs, human rights organisations,
Zimbabwean migrant associations, international organisations, the South African
Department of Home Affairs and the City of Johannesburg (Annex B). Repeated requests
were made for interviews with the Zimbabwe Consulate in South Africa and the
Zimbabwean Department of Home Affairs. At time of writing, these requests had not been
successful.
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3. The Crisis in Zimbabwe
3.1.

Political Persecution, Economic Collapse

There is now a large literature on the causes, characteristics and impacts of the economic and
27
political crisis and near-collapse of Zimbabwe into failed state status. Some date the economic
crisis from the imposition of the failed Structural Adjustment Programme in the 1990s, and out28
migration from the country did start to increase during that decade. But the general descent into
economic and political chaos escalated rapidly after 2000 and is generally reckoned to have
reached its nadir in 2008. Until 2014, the Failed States Index consistently identified Zimbabwe as
one of the top ten countries in the world at high risk for widespread catastrophe, ranking not far
below states that have experienced protracted violent conflict and civil war like Somalia, the
Democratic Republic of Congo and Sudan.
The depth of the crisis in Zimbabwe is indicated by the fact that by 2008, inflation had reached
231 million % (making the Zimbabwean dollar completely worthless); the collapse of the country’s
manufacturing, tourism and commercial agricultural sectors; the shuttering of banks; mass layoffs
and unemployment soaring to over 75%; deepening urban and rural poverty and food insecurity.
Exacerbating the crisis and hardship for ordinary citizens was a government assault on all forms
29
of informal activity and a crisis of failure of urban livelihoods. In 2005, the Mugabe government
launched Operation Murambatsvina (Restore Order/Clear the Trash) which attempted to destroy
all forms of informality (including housing and livelihoods) in the urban areas of the country. An
estimated 650,000 to 700,000 people lost their homes and livelihoods. According to Potts, “the
possible motives for this terrible campaign involved a lethal mix of vindictive electoral politics, a
particularly strong attachment to planned environments, and a wish to reduce the urban
population for political and economic reasons. A major (unsuccessful) objective was to forcibly
30
displace, to rural areas, those urban people whose houses were demolished”.
Mass out-migration was a “perfectly predictable consequence of Zimbabwe’s economic and
31
social collapse” Zimbabwe was transformed from a migrant receiving to a major global sending
32
country in the space of two decades. The mixed migration “exodus” affected all parts of the
33
country and all social and economic strata. Allied to the globally unprecedented shrinkage of the
27
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formal economy, there were what Howard-Hassman has described as “massive human rights
34
violations” between 2000 and 2008. This was a period of intense political conflict and human
rights abuse in Zimbabwe, as internal and external challenges to the ruling political party, the
Zimbabwe African National Union Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) and the government of Robert
Mugabe intensified. The formation and growth of the opposition Movement for Democratic
Change (MDC) provided the first real political opposition to ZANU-PF since independence in
35
1980 and the government responded with considerable brutality.
The formation of a Government of National Unity in 2009, following national elections, led to a
decline in political persecution and stabilisation of the shattered economy. Zimbabwe’s national
economy made a strong recovery between 2009 and 2013, largely due to this political stability,
the ‘dollarisation’ of the economy (which made US$ legal tender); and a new laissez faire policy
36
towards the informal economy on which many households had come to depend. The period of
stability and growth came to an abrupt end with the disbanding of the Government of National
37
Unity after the 2013 elections and a marked decline in the still fragile economy. The years
between 2009 and 2013 do not appear to have led to a slowing or decline in migration out of the
country, although they made it more difficult for Zimbabweans to obtain refugee status in other
countries. Clearly, the shocks of a decade of political and economic turmoil up to 2008 were so
severe that they continued to reverberate.
In the latest Failed States Index, Zimbabwe remains a ‘high alert’ country. The extraordinary
growth of around 9% during the period 2009 to 2012, albeit from a low base, has disappeared
and there has been a continuous deceleration since then, from 3.8% growth in 2014 to an
38
estimated 1.5% in 2015. The World Bank estimates feeble economic growth of only 0.4% this
39
year for the country. Zimbabwe is thus a long way from returning to the pre-economic crisis era
40
and poverty and food insecurity remain endemic (Figure 1). The negative effects on agricultural
productivity of the El Niño-induced drought of 2015 have been compounded by global economic
slowdown in which commodity prices are low and terms of trade unfavourable to Zimbabwe. In
recent months, there have been renewed cash shortages, government failure to pay civil servant
salaries, and growing public discontent over declining economic conditions.
Zimbabwe is therefore again experiencing a downward economic spiral, with emerging political
fragilities and serious fiscal challenges. An added problem due to the sluggish global economy is
the weakening of remittance flows to Zimbabwe, which perform a key function in supplementing
41
incomes, particularly for the most vulnerable households.
The humanitarian situation is
deteriorating steadily, with new estimates by the Zimbabwe Vulnerability Assessment Committee
indicating that 4.1 million persons (42% of the rural population) will need food assistance in early
2017. This is expected to be the highest level recorded since 2009.

34
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Figure 1: Poverty and Food Insecurity in Zimbabwe (2011-2017)

Source: World Bank (2016)

A major consequence of the protracted economic crisis in Zimbabwe has been extensive
informalisation of the economy. FinMark Trust estimates that there are now as many as 3.5
42
million micro, small and medium enterprises in the country. Of these, two million (or 71%) are
individual entrepreneurs and 800,000 (29%) have employees. 46% of the adult population
nationally are small business owners. Nearly half report that the business is their only source of
income. Informal cross-border trading (ICBT) with neighbouring countries such as Botswana,
43
South Africa and Zambia has also become a significant livelihood activity for many.
Although the volume of ICBT is unknown, a recent SAMP survey of over 500 traders in Harare
44
found that the trade was female-dominated (68% women). Nearly 90% had started their
businesses in the post-2000 era and most had never held a formal sector job. The traders cited a
number of business challenges including long delays at the border, heavy import duties, theft,
42
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and competition from other traders. Xenophobia in South Africa was not seen as a significant
challenge with 78% saying their operations have not been affected by xenophobia at all and only
4% saying they had been affected a great deal. The primary reason is probably because the
traders spend so little time in South Africa (an average 1.8 days per visit).
The biggest challenge confronting ICBT traders at the present time is Zimbabwean government
policy. In June 2016, through Statutory Instrument 64 of 2016, the government banned the
importation of a wide variety of goods by informal traders including various processed and tinned
foods, bottled water, dairy products, household furniture, fertiliser, cotton fabric and some building
materials. The announcement triggered widespread and sometimes violent protests by traders in
45
Harare and at the Beitbridge border post between Zimbabwe and South Africa. Circumventing
the ban has now become a major clandestine activity by so-called ‘night runners’ who smuggle
46
goods into the country on behalf of traders under cover of darkness.

3.2.

Migrating Out of Crisis
47

Migration from Zimbabwe to South Africa is not a new phenomenon. However, unlike other
neighbouring countries such as Mozambique, Malawi, Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland, the
numbers of Zimbabweans migrating temporarily to South Africa was relatively limited for much of
48
the twentieth century. In part, this was because most migrants from these other countries
49
worked on contract on the South African mines and commercial farms. Local employers in
Zimbabwe resisted the efforts of South African industry to recruit labour, fearing a loss of their
50
own labour supply. Indeed, for many decades Zimbabwe was an importer of migrant labourers
from countries such as Malawi and Mozambique. In the 1970s, there was brief relaxation of this
policy and the South Africans attempted, with limited success, to recruit Zimbabweans to work on
51
the country’s gold mines. In the 1980s, after independence, many whites left the country and
were welcomed by the apartheid government of the time.
Contemporary large-scale migration from Zimbabwe has its origins in the structural adjustments
reforms of the 1990s when growing unemployment started to increase and a brain drain of skilled
Zimbabweans began. However, it was not until 2000 as the political and economic situation
began to deteriorate, that migration from Zimbabwe began to accelerate and become far more
52
mixed in character. The 2015 United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs
(UNDESA) Bilateral Migration Database shows Zimbabwean migrants now live in at least 50
countries worldwide. Of the 856,345 documented Zimbabwean migrants outside the country,
252,569 (or 29%) were in the North and 603,776 (71%) were in the South. Neighbouring
countries such as Botswana, Malawi, Mozambique, South Africa and Zambia are the major
destinations for South–South migrants from Zimbabwe (Table 1). Some countries, especially in
the North, recognise Zimbabweans as refugees and rates of acceptance of refugee claims are
relatively high. Others, including South Africa, generally do not and rates are low. Fewer than 1%
of Zimbabwean applications for asylum have been granted refugee status (amounting to less than
1,500 in total). Zimbabweans are officially categorised in South Africa as ‘economic migrants’ and
45
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are not afforded the rights and protections of the 1998 Refugees Act, including the right to work
and earn a livelihood.
Table 1: Major Destination Countries for Zimbabwean Migrants (2015)

Country of Destination
South Africa
United Kingdom
United States
Australia
Malawi
Botswana
Mozambique
Zambia
Namibia
Canada
New Zealand
Ireland
Netherlands
Portugal
Switzerland

Number of Migrants
475,406
132,942
50,001
38,843
36,753
31,625
25,429
19,503
13,247
11,118
8,416
3,098
1,423
1,109
1,074
Source: Compiled from: UNDESA (2015). International Migrant Stock 2015. Dataset. United Nations.
The only available time series data comes from official South African entry figures collected at
land and air ports of entry. Data on exits from the country is unavailable. The data set excludes
undocumented migration but shows how legal entries from Zimbabwe to South Africa (for all
purposes) began to rise in the early 1990s and peaked in 1995 when the South African
government imposed visa restrictions on Zimbabweans (Figure 2).The apparent reduction and
stabilisation in migration numbers during the visa period (1995–2005) was offset by irregular
migration which increased significantly during this decade. From 2005 onwards, when visa
requirements were abolished by South Africa, there was an inexorable increase in cross-border
movement that has shown few signs of abating. There was a small decline in 2007-8, but the
economic recovery between 2009 and 2012 appears to have had no impact as the numbers
continued to rise and passed two million per annum for the first time in 2013.
Figure 2: Legal Entries to South Africa from Zimbabwe (1983–2014)

Source: Compiled from Statistics South Africa data
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The crisis-driven nature of migration from Zimbabwe is reflected in the reasons given by migrants
53
for leaving the country. Makina interviewed over 4,000 Zimbabweans in Johannesburg in 2007.
Figure 2 shows the primary reason given for migration by year of first migration. Political reasons
were cited as the most important reason for migration between 2002 and 2006 (a period of
intense political conflict and crisis). After 2006, economic conditions in Zimbabwe and
employment opportunities in South Africa became the most important factors, as they had been
before 2001.
Figure 3: Main Reason for Leaving Zimbabwe by Year of Departure
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Source: Makina, D. (2010), p.229.

SAMP’s survey of 500 Zimbabwean migrants who had come to South Africa between 2005 and
2010 confirmed the importance of poor economic prospects and living conditions in Zimbabwe as
drivers of migration, with 84% citing overall living conditions, and 44% citing food and hunger as
54
reasons for migrating (Table 2). Given continued limited job opportunities in Zimbabwe, the
main pull factors were the search for formal and informal employment in South Africa (given by 71%
and 30% of interviewees respectively). The decline in forced migration first observed by Makina is
clear with only 11% of the migrants giving political persecution or the search for asylum as a
55
reason for migrating from Zimbabwe.
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Table 2: Reasons for Migration from Zimbabwe to South Africa (2005–2010)

Push Factors

%

Overall living conditions

84.0

Food/hunger

44.4

Education/ schools

13.2

Safety of self/family

15.0

Asylum

6.2

Political exile

4.6

Drought

4.2

Pull Factors

%

Informal sector job

71.2

Formal sector job

30.2

Moved with family

16.4

Attractions of urban life

6.2

Marriage

5.6

Freedom/democracy/peace

2.6

Sent to live with family

1.4

Housing

0.3

Note: multiple response question
Source: SAMP

Zimbabwe’s crisis-driven migration is not confined to job-seekers or one particular demographic
or age group, however. The Zimbabwean migrant population in South Africa is extremely
heterogeneous and comprises both sexes (in roughly equal numbers), all age groups from young
children to seniors, and all education and skill levels. Crush et al. found that there were more
female migrants, a greater proportion of youth migrants, and many more unmarried migrants and
56
sons and daughters in households than in the past (Table 3). Not captured in this table was the
57
increase in family migration and unaccompanied child migration.
Betts and Kaytaz label the exodus from Zimbabwe an example of “survival migration” which they
define as including refugees and also “people who are forced to cross an international border to
58
flee state failure, severe environmental distress, or widespread livelihood collapse”. Under
conditions of survival migration, the traditional distinction between refugees and economic
59
migrants breaks down. The argument that all Zimbabwean migrants should be defined as
‘survival migrants’, while superficially attractive, requires closer scrutiny. For example, it is based
in part on the view that conditions in Zimbabwe are so dire that out-migration for survival is the
only option.
However, this does not explain why the majority of Zimbabweans have not left nor the role of
60
migration in reducing pressures for further out-migration through remittances. The argument
that all Zimbabweans are ‘survival migrants’ also runs the danger of homogenising migrant flows
56
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60
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and downplaying the heterogeneity of migration movement out of the country. The argument that
all migrants from Zimbabwe are ‘survival migrants’ also seems to rest on the admittedly
desperate situation of migrants in squalid transit shelters in the border town of Musina and at
61
overcrowded safe havens such as the Central Methodist Church in Johannesburg. The idea of
‘survival migration’ fits with this sub-set of Zimbabwean migrants but certainly does not
encompass them all.
Table 3: Demographic Profile of Zimbabwean Migrants (2010)

Sex
Male
Female
Age
15 – 24
25 – 39
>40
Marital Status
Unmarried
Married
Formerly married *
Status in Household
Household Head
Spouse
Sons/Daughters
Other Family
Other
* Separated/divorced/abandoned/widowed

%
56
44
31
59
10
49
41
10
28
15
43
12
2

Source: Crush, J. and Ramachandran, S. (2015b).

Far from being the desperate and destitute people conveyed by images of ‘survival migration’,
many Zimbabwean migrants to South Africa exhibit considerable ingenuity, industry and energy.
Crush et al. found that 62% of post-2004 Zimbabwean migrants surveyed in Cape Town and
62
Johannesburg were employed and another 20% worked in the informal economy. Only 18%
were unemployed including 14% who had never had a job in South Africa. At the same time,
increasing numbers were doing more menial jobs including a quarter in manual work, 13% in the
service industry and 8% in domestic work (Table 4). A longitudinal study of day labourers in
Tshwane clearly demonstrates the increase in Zimbabweans seeking casual work from 7% in
63
2004 to 33% in 2007 to 45% in 2015 (Figure 4).

61
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Table 4: Occupations of Zimbabwean Migrants (2010)

%
Manual worker

23.8

Professional

14.1

Service worker

12.6

Domestic worker

8.4

Security

4.1

Office worker

4.1

Student

2.9

Employer/manager

1.0

Unemployed

18.0

One of the major consequences of migration from Zimbabwe to South Africa has been a reverse
flow of remittances in cash and goods, particularly food. Without remittances the flow of migrants
from Zimbabwe to South Africa would have been even larger since remittances exercised a
64
stabilising effect and encouraged some family members to remain behind.
There is
considerable evidence that remittances are primarily used for basic household expenditures such
65
as food, clothing, health and education. The actual volume of remittances, and how this might
66
have changed over time, is not known since the use of informal channels is common. The World
Bank bilateral remittances database contains a blank cell for remittance flows from South Africa
to Zimbabwe. Two recent studies have estimated the total annual amount of cash remittances
67
from South Africa to Zimbabwe at between ZAR 5 and ZAR 7 billion (3 and 5 billion EUR).
However, both estimates are based on the remitting behaviour of small samples and
unsubstantiated assumptions about the size of the Zimbabwean population in South Africa.
Makina and Masenge argue that the level of remitting first increases with the time spent in South
68
Africa and later declines after an estimated 8 years of migration experience. They also found
that the level of remittances was positively related to the number of dependents in Zimbabwe,
legal status, access to banking, and income and savings levels, and negatively related to
64
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education level, return intentions, frequency of home visits and economic and political reasons for
migrating. On the other hand, Crush et al.’s study of Zimbabwean migrants who arrived in South
Africa for the first time after 2004 argues that this cohort remits less, and less frequently, than its
69
predecessors. They attribute this to the greater incidence of family migration and the fact that
the nature of migration is changing with greater interest amongst migrants in settling permanently
or semi-permanently in South Africa.
Figure 4: Zimbabwean Day Labourers in Tshwane (2004–2015)

Source: Blaauw, D., Pretorius, A. and Schenck, R. (2016), p.3.

The legal status of Zimbabweans in South Africa has fluctuated over time. At present, most
Zimbabweans in South Africa either hold work permits or short-term visitor’s permits which allow
a stay of up to 90 days. The number holding wok permits greatly increased (to close to 300,000)
in 2010 when the South African government introduced an immigration amnesty for
Zimbabweans (see below). Prior to that, many Zimbabweans had been applying for, and
automatically receiving, asylum-seeker permits. Very few Zimbabweans (less than 3,000) have
ever been granted full refugee status in South Africa. At the present time, around 20-30,000
Zimbabweans per annum are still acquiring asylum-seeker permits. The numbers who are in the
country without any documentation or who entered legally and have overstayed is unknown but is
probably not as large as the media often claims (that is, in the millions). The Southern African
Development Community (SADC) Draft Protocol on the Facilitation of Movement has never been
implemented so has had no material effect on facilitating migration from Zimbabwe.

69
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3.3.

South African Policy Responses to Crisis Migration

Polzer has reviewed the response of the South African government to the political and economic
crisis in Zimbabwe and observed that “a rapid influx of hundreds of thousands of people would be
70
treated by most countries as a serious crisis requiring immediate attention”. On the contrary,
South Africa’s official reaction to this movement has been characterised by “a studied
71
determination not to acknowledge that anything is out of the ordinary”. In May 2007, President
72
Thabo Mbeki even noted that the influx was just “something we have to live with”. In general,
what has struck most observers about the South African response is the “totality of the silence”
from Parliament and the central government. The failure to provide any kind of strategic policy
response to the influx is seen as consistent with South Africa’s foreign policy of accommodation
of the Mugabe regime and associated downplaying and minimisation of the magnitude of the
73
crisis in Zimbabwe itself.
The policy silence towards crisis-driven migration from Zimbabwe did not mean paralysis on the
ground, as the Department of Home Affairs (DHA) and the South African Police Services (SAPS)
intensified efforts to identify, arrest and deport Zimbabweans from South Africa back to Zimbabwe.
Between 2000 and 2013, South Africa deported over two million migrants, of whom 960,000 (or
42%) were from Zimbabwe (Table 5). Deportations peaked in 2007 and 2008, when the economic
crisis in Zimbabwe was at its most severe. In part of 2010 and 2011, there was a temporary
moratorium on deportations to Zimbabwe, which resumed again in 2012. There is little evidence
that mass deportations were anything other than a costly failure as most of those deported soon
74
returned. The deportation machinery was also plagued by bribery, corruption and abuse of
75
migrants’ basic human rights.
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Table 5: Deportations of Zimbabweans from South Africa (2000–2013)

Year

2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
Totals

Number of Zimbabwean
deportations

Total deportations from
South Africa

45,922
47,697
38,118
55,753
72,112
97,433
109,532
204,827
164,678
35,693
4,805
10,100
38,897
35,251
960,818

145,575
156,123
135,870
164,808
167,137
209,988
266,067
312,733
280,837
105,960
56,793
65,383
103,259
113,554
2,284,787

Zimbabwean
deportations as %
of total
deportations
31.5
30.6
28.1
33.8
43.1
46.4
41.2
65.5
58.6
33.7
8.5
15.4
37.8
31.0
42.1

Source: DHA (South Africa) Annual Reports

Mass deportations prompted an immediate counter-response by many migrants who were
seeking to legalise their stay in South Africa. Under Section 22 of South Africa’s 1998 Refugees
Act, all asylum-seekers are entitled to apply for and be granted a six month renewable asylumseekers permit which legalises their stay in the country. The law was unclear on whether asylumseekers (as opposed to refugee permit holders) were allowed to work or study in the country. In
2003, the South African Supreme Court of Appeal ruled that asylum-seekers did, in fact, have
such rights in a case involving the Minister of Home Affairs versus Muriel Watchenuka, a
76
Zimbabwean migrant in South Africa. While the new South African Green Paper on International
Migration proposes to deny asylum-seekers such rights, from 2003 to the present they have been
77
able to work and study pending adjudication of their application for refugee status.
As a direct result of the Watchenuka judgement, as well as the intensification of deportations,
Zimbabwean applications for asylum rose from less than 200 in 2002 to nearly 20,000 in 2006
and to almost 150,000 in 2009 (Figure 5). Thus, the unintended consequence of mass
deportations and the ‘total silence’ surrounding a coherent policy response to crisis migration
from Zimbabwe was that South Africa’s refugee determination system was quickly overwhelmed
by Zimbabwean asylum-seekers. Applications by Zimbabweans for asylum comprised more than
half (51%) of the total received in South Africa during the period 2000-2012. In 2010 alone,
Zimbabweans made up 81% of the applications for asylum. A total of 587,520 asylum
applications were received from Zimbabweans in South Africa between 2003 and 2015, of which
only 153,924 (26%) were adjudicated. However, only 1,292 Zimbabweans were granted refugee
status over the entire period (an approval rate of less than 1% and amongst the lowest globally),
adding credence to the view that the South African government considers Zimbabwean asylumseekers to be economic rather than forced migrants (Table 6).
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Table 6: Adjudication of Zimbabwean Refugee Claims (2003–2015)

Year

Applications

Decisions

Approved

Rejected

Approval
Rate %

2003

2,588

25

9

16

36.0

2004

5,789

93

24

69

25.8

2005

7,783

271

83

187

30.7

2006

18,973

1,981

103

1,878

5.2

2007

17,667

1,894

271

1,623

14.3

2008

111,968

0

0

0

0.0

2009

149,453

15,701

200

15,370

1.3

2010

146,566

33,179

429

32,750

1.3

2011

51,031

15,987

83

15,904

0.5

2012

20,842

16,926

9

16,881

0.1

2013

16,670

16,816

65

15,978

0.4

2014

20,405

33,855

16

32,811

0.1

2015

17,785

17,206

0

17,203

0.0

Totals

587,520

153,934

1,292

150,670

0.8

Source: Compiled from: UNHCR Population Statistics database (2016).
Figure 5: Zimbabwean Asylum Applications in South Africa (2000–2010)

Source: Crush, J. and Ramachandran, S. (2015b).

The resort to asylum-seeker permits by Zimbabwean migrants mean that the South African
refugee determination system became so overburdened that an asylum-seeker permit effectively

19

78

operated as a work permit. To encourage Zimbabweans out of the refugee protection system
and reset the clock, the government offered an “immigration amnesty” to Zimbabwean migrants in
2010 – the Zimbabwe Dispensation Programme or ZDP – with four-year residence and work
79
permits. Around 270,000 migrants took advantage of the offer. In 2014, new permits were
issued for another 4 years.
Makina found a relatively high intention to return to Zimbabwe amongst his Johannesburg
80
interviewees. Two-thirds of his interviewees indicated that they intended to return and only a
third said they intended to stay. Intention to return was positively related to sex (with males more
likely to return than females), the reason for migrating (with those who left for economic reasons
more likely than those who left for political reasons), whether or not they had dependants they
supported in Zimbabwe (with those without dependants more likely to stay), level of education
(with the more educated more likely than the less educated), economic activity, income (with
higher earners less likely to return) and length of stay in South Africa (with recent migrants more
likely to expect to return). Amongst migrants who had migrated in the worst years of the
Zimbabwean crisis (between 2005 and 2010), however, Crush et al. found that 46% intended to
81
stay for a few years and 21% to stay in South Africa indefinitely. Another indicator of growing
intention to remain in South Africa is the frequency of return visits to Zimbabwe. As Table 7
shows there was a marked difference between Zimbabwean migrants canvassed in 2005 and
2010.
Table 7: Frequency of Return to Zimbabwe

2005 (%)

2010 (%)

At Least Once A Month

31

<1

Every Few Months

19

9

Once or Twice A Year

26

28

Less Frequently

25

9

Not Returned

0

46

Cannot Return

0

3

Will Never Return

0

2

Source: Crush, J. and Ramachandran, S. (2015b).

78

Kriger, N. (2010). The Politics of Legal Status for Zimbabweans in South Africa. In J. McGregor and R.
Primorac, (eds.), Zimbabwe’s New Diaspora: Displacement and the Cultural Politics of Survival (New York
and Oxford: Berghahn Books), pp. 77-102.
79
Thebe, V. (2016). Two Steps Forward, One Step Back”: Zimbabwean Migration and South Africa’s
Regularising Programme (the ZDP). Journal of International Migration and Integration (online).
80
Makina, D. (2012). Determinants of Return Migration Intentions: Evidence from Zimbabwean Migrants
Living in South Africa. Development Southern Africa 29: 365-378.
81
Crush, J. and Ramachandran, S. (2015b).

20

4. The Crisis of Xenophobia in South Africa
4.1.

Xenophobic Violence in 2008

The crisis of xenophobia in South Africa is generally associated with the ‘perfect storm’ of antimigrant violence of May 2008. However, the ‘crisis’ is better viewed as an ongoing phenomenon
with a number of different dimensions. First, there is pervasive negative attitudes and
stereotyping among the general population of migrants and refugees, from the rest of Africa in
particular. The strength of these xenophobic attitudes have been repeatedly demonstrated in
82
attitudinal surveys. Second, xenophobic treatment of migrants and refugees, often accompanied
by hostile rhetoric and hate speech, has been well-documented in the public health sector, in
83
schools and on the streets, including against many Zimbabwean migrants. Third, xenophobic
attitudes, language and treatment are all pre-conditions for xenophobic violence. Misago et al.
84
describe the link as follows :
“Xenophobia in South Africa translates into a broad spectrum of behaviours including
discriminatory, stereotyping and dehumanizing remarks; discriminatory policies and
practices by government and private officials such as exclusion from public services to
which target groups are entitled; selective enforcement of by-laws by local authorities;
assault and harassment by state agents particularly the police and immigration officials;
as well as public threats and violence commonly known as xenophobic violence that
often results in massive loss of lives and livelihoods.”
This report focuses primarily on xenophobic violence (or extreme xenophobia), which has been
characterised above as manifesting in both an acute and chronic form. Violent attacks on
migrants and refugees in South Africa have been documented from as early as the mid-1990s.
Some of these incidents certainly affected migrants from Zimbabwe:




In late 1994 and early 1995 in Alexandra, Johannesburg, an aggressive campaign called
buyelekhaya (literally ‘go home’) unfolded when armed youth groups attempted to forcibly
remove Mozambican, Zimbabwean and Malawian migrants, holding them responsible for
increased crimes and unemployment. Some of the affected migrants were long-time
residents of this township;
In 2001, after a Zimbabwean migrant was blamed for the death of a South African
woman, local residents attacked many migrants from Zimbabwe, ransacked 124 shacks
and burned 74, and forced the occupants to abandon the Zandspruit settlement outside

82
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Johannesburg. South African women in relationships with Zimbabwean males were also
attacked;
In 2005, Zimbabwean and Somali refugees were assaulted by residents during a protest
against the municipality in Bothaville, Free State. Some 80 refugees were displaced and
robbed of all their belongings;
In 2006, two Zimbabweans were killed during clashes between South Africans and nonSouth Africans in the informal settlement of Olievenhoutbosch. Some Zimbabweans left
the settlement and returned home;
In 2007, after an altercation between a South African and Zimbabwean family spiralled
out of control in Mooiplaas, Gauteng, local residents attacked migrants from Zimbabwe,
resulting in two deaths, eleven injuries and ransacking of over 100 migrant-run
businesses;
In March and April 2008, Zimbabwean migrants were attacked in the informal settlement
of Diepsloot in northern Johannesburg, resulting in three deaths and the destruction of
migrant homes.

The important point is that xenophobic attacks on Zimbabwean migrants pre-dated the nationwide
violence of May 2008. The attacks that month began in Alexandra in Johannesburg where a mob
85
began attacking the homes of all those they deemed to be “outsiders”. What started as an
isolated incident within this settlement soon engulfed many different locations in Gauteng
86
province and then spread to other provinces, including the Western and Eastern Cape. Violence
was also reported from KwaZulu-Natal and Limpopo. Although anyone perceived as a ‘foreigner’
in the affected communities came under attack, some accounts suggested that certain migrant
groups such as Zimbabweans were being especially targeted. South Africa’s Mail & Guardian
newspaper reported that in settlements like Cleveland near Johannesburg, Zimbabweans were
87
singled out, resulting in five deaths and fifty injured migrants. By mid-May, the violence had
spread to Cape Town, where many migrants, including Zimbabweans, were being viciously
88
assaulted.
By the time the xenophobic violence subsided, there had been at least 60 murders, dozens of
rapes and 700 serious injuries, and more than 100,000 migrants had been displaced from their
89
homes to 90 temporary shelters around the country. Property and possessions worth millions of
ZAR were looted or destroyed. A Parliamentary Task Team investigating the violence noted that
the “impact of the violence and attacks was severe as many people were gripped by fear and
experienced the trauma of people being evicted from their homes, being physically assaulted,
90
killed and in some instances, burnt”. Many of those who were displaced during the May 2008
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violence elected not to return to the settlements from which they were displaced for fear of further
91
attacks. Early returnees faced renewed violence or were murdered at various locations.

4.2.

Xenophobic Violence in the Informal Economy

While the mob violence of May 2008 remains unmatched in its ferocity, scale and devastating
impact, xenophobic attacks did not cease thereafter. The main shift has been in the targeting of
certain migrants. The violence of May 2008 was relatively indiscriminate. Mob attacks since that
time have increasingly focused on migrant and refugee business owners in the informal
92
economy. Between mid-2009 and late 2010, for example, there were at least 20 deaths, 200
foreign-owned shops looted and more than 4,000 displaced due to violence targeting migrants. In
2012, there were 140 deaths and 250 serious injuries. And in early 2014, an estimated 200 shops
93
were looted and 900 persons were displaced. Crush and Ramachandran document 220
episodes of collective violence against migrants and refugee businesses in various locations
94
around the country between 2005 and 2014 (not including May 2008). The violence has
increased in frequency over time (Table 6). Pre-2005 incidents constitute less than 5% of
recorded episodes. A definite upswing is seen from 2006 onwards, with the sharpest growth
occurring after 2008. Excluding events in May 2008, nearly 90% of episodes of group violence
against migrant businesses were recorded since the beginning of 2008. The five years with the
largest number of incidents were from 2010 to 2014. The highest annual number (20% of the total)
was recorded in 2010.
Table 8: Frequency of Collective Xenophobic Attacks

Year
Pre-2005
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014 (to end-August)
Total

No. of Incidents
9
4
9
9
19
17
46
22
25
36
32
228

% of Total
4
2
4
4
8
7
20
10
11
16
14
100

Source: Crush, J. and Ramachandran, S. (2015a).

The majority of South African provinces have been affected by collective violence against
migrant-owned businesses. In 2005-6, incidents occurred in six distinct locations within three
provinces. In 2009, they occurred in at least 14 separate locations extending over six of the nine
provinces in South Africa. In 2010, there were at least 37 separate locations situated in six
provinces. The number of affected areas fell somewhat to 22 in 2012 and 27 in 2013, but the
number of affected provinces was still six and seven respectively. In general, the Western Cape
and Gauteng have experienced the highest levels of this form of xenophobic violence.
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Each episode of collective violence targeting small businesses includes some combination of the
following: written or verbal threats and insults; public intimidation through protests or marches;
forced shop closures; direct physical assaults of migrant store owners or their employees; looting
of store contents; damage to the physical structure of shops, especially through arson; damage or
destruction of other business property belonging to migrants, including homes and cars;
temporary or permanent forced displacement of migrant entrepreneurs and their families from an
area; and extortion for protection by local leaders, police and residents. The nature and intensity
of the violence against migrants between 2008 and 2015 is illustrated by a brief description of
some of the attacks reported in the media:
















In 2009 in De Doorns, Western Cape, local residents looted and destroyed the homes of
Zimbabwean migrants, accusing them of stealing jobs from citizens and accepting lower
95
wages. Migrants from this country were singled out for attacks and an estimated 3,000
migrants were forcibly displaced. Seven Zimbabwean migrants were killed in the informal
settlement of Stofland after they were cornered in a shack which was set ablaze.
In 2011, in Lebokwagamo near Polokwane, residents attacked migrants living in the area,
looting and damaging their homes and businesses.
In 2011, many Zimbabweans living in Seshego township near Polokwane in Limpopo
Province were forcibly displaced following attacks by large groups of local residents
during which one migrant was stoned to death.
In 2012, more than 700 shops were looted and/or destroyed and over 500 migrants were
displaced because of public violence in Botshabelo in the Free State province.
In 2012, four spaza shops (informal convenience shops) were bombed in Mitchells Plain,
Cape Town, after their migrant owners refused to pay protection money.
In 2012, two Bangladeshi traders suffered third degree burns and later died after a group
of assailants threw a petrol-bomb on their container store in Thokoza and blocked the
store’s entrance preventing their escape. Three shops were petrol-bombed during largescale looting of Somali-owned businesses in the Valhalla Park area of Cape Town.
In 2013, after an altercation in Duduza on the East Rand over a cellphone airtime
voucher between a Somali shop owner and a local youth, who was shot, some 200
stores belonging to Somali, Ethiopian, Eritrean and Bangladeshi migrants were stripped
of their contents and several structures were incinerated.
In 2013, more than 150 migrant-owned shops were looted in four days in Port Elizabeth.
A Somali refugee, Abdi Nasir Mahmoud Good, was publicly stoned to death while
attempting to salvage his belongings from his ransacked store.
In 2013, more than 200 migrant shopkeepers operating small-scale businesses in the
town of Delmas east of Johannesburg were forced to close their stores after a spate of
attacks against them.
In 2014, two refugees were killed when nearly 100 migrant businesses were looted or
torched in Mamelodi East outside Pretoria. The violence was repeated in the Phomolong
area of Pretoria two months later when three persons were killed and several others were
wounded during a rampage that lasted for three weeks.
In 2015 there were sustained xenophobic attacks in Grahamstown in the Eastern Cape.
More than 500 people were displaced and more than 300 shops and homes looted and,
in some cases, destroyed.

South African competitors in the informal economy have increasingly adopted a strategy of
“violent entrepreneurship”; that is, the use of violence to intimidate and drive migrant
96
entrepreneurs out of an area. A distinctive feature is the emergence and incendiary stance of
loosely formed groups, purportedly representing many or all South African small business owners.
These groups range from localised structures like the Zanokhanyo Retailers’ Association
operating in townships, settlements and urban areas such as Khayelitsha, to larger regional
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forums like the innocuously-named Greater Gauteng Business Forum. The Middelburg Small
Business Community Forum claimed credit for mobilising local authorities after the Steve
Tshwete Municipality shut down fifty Somali-owned shops and refused to issue them with trading
licenses to these traders. Accusing them of unfair competition and rising crime, the local Forum
stoked group violence against migrant-run shops in Lephalale in Limpopo in 2013 in the course of
which five shops, two houses and three vehicles were razed. Such groups have engaged in
numerous public hate campaigns against migrant businesses, liberally using belligerent tactics
ranging from forced store closures, coerced increase of store prices, limits on the number of
migrant businesses in an area, and public threats through letters or by radio.

4.3.

Xenophobic Violence in 2015

A second major wave of xenophobic violence erupted in Kwazulu Natal in early 2015 following a
labour strike in Isipingo, Durban, where a supermarket owner was accused (incorrectly) of
employing foreign migrants to break a labour strike and residents began looting and burning
foreign-owned shops. The violence escalated after the traditionalist Zulu leader King Goodwill
Zwelethini reportedly denounced foreign nationals and businesses in a public speech attended by
97
the Minister of Police and demanded that they leave the country. Almost immediately, the antimigrant violence spread rapidly from Isipingo to other places in the province of KwaZulu-Natal,
98
including Chatsworth, Sydenham, Malukazi and KwaMashu. Within days, mob violence also
broke out in and around Johannesburg, including in Soweto, leading to further loss of life,
displacement of thousands and large-scale damage to property. A good deal of the March 2015
violence targeted informal business owners in KwaZulu Natal, Gauteng and Limpopo. Large
numbers of migrant-owned businesses were looted and torched in towns in all three provinces.
The Ethiopian Community in Kwazulu Natal later claimed that 600–700 shops owned by its
99
members were targeted and burnt and six people were burnt alive inside their shops.
The Special Reference Group (SRG), an independent commission of enquiry appointed by the
KwaZulu-Natal provincial government and headed by Judge Navi Pillay (formerly the United
Nations Commissioner for Human Rights), investigated the violence and released its 150-page
100
report in late 2015. The SRG reported that over 5,000 displaced migrants in KwaZulu-Natal
were temporarily housed in shelters outside the areas affected by the violence. A census of the
shelters on 21 April 2015 recorded 5,603 people of whom the majority were Malawians (3,399),
Mozambicans (1,074) and Zimbabweans (667) (SRG, 2015: 122). While some of the displaced
migrants were directly attacked, many more fled their homes out of fear because of widely
circulating rumours about fresh violence (SRG, 2015). A Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF)
psychologist visited the camps and observed:
“The kind of trauma I saw in the Chatsworth camp is similar to what I’ve seen in
displacement camps in Central African Republic and South Sudan where people have
been exposed to active conflicts. From our interviews with these camp residents it’s clear
that some have suffered cumulative traumas. They have experienced violence in their
countries of origin; again during the 2008 xenophobic violence; and yet again in 2015.
However, they also tell us about the daily level of discrimination and alienation they
101
experience – at hospitals, in minibus taxis and from the police.”
The SRG argued that the immediate cause of the outbreak of violence was “deliberate efforts of
select individuals, some of whom had interests in the informal trading sector, to drive away
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competition by foreign national-owned businesses… These deliberate efforts sparked the
outbreak of widespread incidents of criminality, violence and looting of properties owned by
102
foreign nationals”. Furthermore, “many of the perceptions of foreign national traders, although
largely unfounded, contributed to heightened tensions”:
“Competition between local and foreign national communities in the small enterprise and
informal business sector is amongst the most divisive and immediate causes of the
violent attacks. The rapidly changing environment of the informal ‘spaza and tuck shop’
sector, characterised by the entrance of large retail chains into the townships, has
resulted in the displacement of many traders. Foreign national traders appear to find
103
ways of surviving in this competitive environment.”
Interestingly, the SRG studiously avoided labelling the violence as xenophobic or seeing
xenophobia as a contributing or even motivating factor. At most, it conceded that “the violent
attacks against foreign nationals were, in some measure, fuelled by dominant and negative
104
perceptions that exist amongst locals and foreign nationals about one another”. However, it is
hard to see how the attitudes of foreign nationals could be responsible for their own victimisation.
Also, none of the mob violence was perpetrated by migrants on South Africans. An antixenophobia protest march organised by NGOs and migrant groups to City Hall on 7 April was
actually declared illegal and the police used water cannons, teargas and rubber bullets to
disperse the crowd.
The SRG’s view that the attitudes of migrants towards South Africans were equally culpable in
105
“fuelling” the violence seems misplaced and a clear example of xenophobia denialism. The Ad
Hoc Parliamentary Committee’s investigation of the 2015 violence went even further, repeatedly
106
asserting that xenophobia as a phenomenon does not exist in South Africa. Citing a standard
dictionary definition of xenophobia as an attitudinal orientation of “fear, hostility and dislike” of
foreigners, the Committee claimed that South Africans do not hate or loathe migrants and
refugees. In the parliamentary deliberations leading up to the adoption of the report, it was
recommended that the term ‘xenophobia’ be omitted completely from the report because no
107
convincing evidence had apparently been found that the phenomenon even existed. The final
report notes that “Parliament had not yet come to the conclusion that the incidents of violence
against foreign nationals were due to xenophobia as per the dictionary definition of extreme,
108
irrational hatred of foreign nationals”.
Instead, the report focuses on “increased economic
competition” between citizens and migrants, and the growing entry of unskilled migrants whose
presence supposedly disadvantages the poorest citizens.

4.4.

Explanations for Xenophobic Violence

Crush and Ramachandran classify explorations of the relationship between xenophobia and
violence into three main types: (a) denialism (which essentially denies that xenophobia even
exists and that the violence was the actions of criminal elements looting for material gain); (b)
minimalism (which argues that xenophobia may exist but is an epiphenomenon and that the
109
structural causes are grinding poverty and dissatisfaction with government). Minimalists also
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argue that South Africans are equally vulnerable to violence as ‘foreigners’; and (c) realism which
sees the rise of xenophobia in post-apartheid South Africa and the pre-disposition of a significant
minority of South Africans to use violent means to drive ‘foreigners’ out of their communities as a
prime causes of the attacks. Examples of all three positions can be found in both the research
literature and the public pronouncements of politicians and officials (see below).
A national survey by SAMP in 2010 asked a representative sample of South Africans in violence110
affected areas why they thought the violence of May 2008 had occurred. Many reproduced the
common negative stereotypes of migrants as a way of explaining the violence, implying that
migrants themselves were to blame: they were criminals, cheat South Africans, use the public
health system without paying, take jobs from South Africans, and take housing earmarked for
South Africans. These explanations all suggest, in one way or another, a belief that the presence
of migrants materially disadvantages South Africans and that this precipitates violence against
them. However, nearly two-thirds of interviewees attributed the violence to non-material factors
including that that migrants are “culturally different”, “do not belong in South Africa” and “steal
South African women” (a paternalistic and disparaging reference to marriages between South
African women and migrant men).
Table 9: Explanations for May 2008 Violence by South Africans

Explanations
Migrants cause crime in South Africa
Migrants cheat South Africans
Migrants are culturally different
Migrants use health services for free
Migrants do not belong in South Africa
Migrants take jobs from South Africans
Migrants take RDP houses from South Africans
Migrants steal South African women

% Agreed
70
66
64
63
62
58
57
57

Source: Crush, J., Ramachandran, S. and Pendleton, W. (2013).
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5. Zimbabweans in the South African Informal Economy
5.1.

Migration Profile

The extent of participation by Zimbabwean migrants in the informal economy is not known with
any certainty. SAMP’s 2005 national survey of migrant-sending households in Zimbabwe found
that 21% of migrants outside the country employed in non-agricultural work were working in the
111
informal economy (although this included all destinations not just South Africa).
Makina’s
112
survey of migrants in Johannesburg found that 19% were working as hawkers or artisans.
SAMP’s 2010 survey of recent Zimbabwean migrants in Johannesburg and Cape Town found
113
that 27% were working or deriving income from the informal economy.
Crush and Tawodzera’s
survey of the food insecurity of Zimbabwean households in South Africa found that 36% of
114
household members in employment were working in the informal economy. While no more
than indicative, these studies suggest that somewhere between 20–30% of Zimbabwean
migrants in major South African cities could be involved in the informal economy. They also
suggest that the importance of informal sector employment to Zimbabweans has increased over
time.
A demographic profile of Zimbabwean informal business-owners in Cape Town and
Johannesburg can be constructed from the SAMP survey of 304 entrepreneurs. First, the survey
found a distinct gender bias in both cities with 60% of the Zimbabwean entrepreneurs in Cape
Town and 65% of those in Johannesburg being male. This is in marked contrast to the business
of informal cross-border trading between Zimbabwe and South Africa which is dominated by
115
female Zimbabwean entrepreneurs. Compared to other groups of migrants in the South African
informal economy, however, women are better represented. Women comprised 30% of the entire
sample of migrant entrepreneurs in Cape Town and 27% in Johannesburg (compared with 40%
and 35% of the Zimbabwean sub-sample).
Second, the age profile of Zimbabwean migrant entrepreneurs in South Africa is heavily slanted
towards youth (Figure 4). Adopting the ILO definition of youth in Africa as anyone under the age
of 35, then 75% of those operating in Cape Town and 50% of those in Johannesburg qualify as
116
youth entrepreneurs. At the other end of the age spectrum, there were more older Zimbabwean
migrant entrepreneurs in Johannesburg with 22% over the age of 45 compared to only 10% of
those operating in Cape Town.
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Figure 6: Age Profile of Zimbabwean Informal Entrepreneurs
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Third, the Zimbabwean entrepreneurs were relatively well-educated (Table 10). The proportion
with no education at all was around 9% (which was higher than both the South African adult
population as a whole and South African migrants working in the informal economy surveyed in
2016 in another SAMP study). However, half of the Zimbabweans had either finished high school
or had a tertiary qualification (compared to 42% of the South African population and only 27% of
the South African entrepreneurs). In general, Zimbabwean entrepreneurs in Cape Town appear
to be much better educated than those in Johannesburg.
Table 10: Educational Levels of Zimbabwean Entrepreneurs and South Africans

Zimbabwean
Entrepreneurs
(%)
No formal schooling

9.2

8.6

South African
Migrant
Entrepreneurs
2016 (%)
2.4

Primary only

6.9

16.9

16.2

Some high school

36.8

33.9

43.3

High school diploma

32.6

28.9

16.8

Post-secondary qualifications

14.5

11.8

10.0

5.2.

All South
Africans (2011
Census)
(%)

Drivers of Migration to South Africa

The number of interviewed migrant entrepreneurs who arrived in South Africa peaked in the crisis
years between 2005 and 2010 at the height of the economic crisis in Zimbabwe and appears to
have fallen thereafter (Table 11). Less than 2% had migrated to South Africa before 1994. Nearly
18% of the Johannesburg migrant entrepreneurs had moved there before 2000 compared to only
2% of those in Cape Town. Over time, Cape Town has become increasingly attractive as a
destination. As many as 88% of the migrants in Cape Town arrived in the city after 2005
(compared to 52% of those who moved to Johannesburg).
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Table 11: Year of Arrival in South Africa

Total
%

Cape Town
%

Johannesburg
%

Before 1994

1.6

0.8

2.2

1994-1999

10.2

1.7

15.6

2000-2004

22.4

9.3

30.6

2005-2009

42.4

55.1

34.4

2010-2014

23.4

33.1

17.2

The reasons for migration to South Africa were clearly related to the ongoing economic crisis in
Zimbabwe. The interviewees were asked whether they agreed or disagreed with a series of
statements and over 80% agreed with the proposition that that they had come to South Africa in
order to provide for family back home. As many as 73% also agreed that they had come to South
Africa to look for employment (Figure 7). There was a marked difference between the
Johannesburg and Cape Town entrepreneurs (with 82% and 59% in agreement respectively)
which may reflect differences in the perception (and reality) of labour market access in the two
cities. The reverse was true with regard to starting a business as a reason for migration with 56%
in Cape Town and 35% in Johannesburg in agreement. In general, this suggests that
Johannesburg is seen as a place where it is easier to obtain formal sector employment and Cape
Town is a more amenable location for starting an informal business.
Figure 7: Reasons for Migrating to South Africa
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Unemployment was a significant driver of migration to South Africa, with 39% of the sample
reporting that they were unemployed prior to leaving Zimbabwe (Table 12). Again, there was a
marked difference between the entrepreneurs in the two cities: only 20% of the Cape Town
interviewees were unemployed prior to leaving compared with 51% of the Johannesburg
interviewees. This is not especially consistent with the finding about the more recent pattern of
migration to Cape Town since we would expect higher levels of unemployment amongst more
recent migrants. Distance and cost might therefore play a mitigating role in the choice of
destinations as unemployed individuals could find it easier to raise the funds to travel the shorter
distance to Johannesburg. Cape Town is obviously much further afield and those with jobs in
Zimbabwe might also have had the resources to get to Cape Town.
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Table 12: Occupation Prior to Leaving Zimbabwe

Total
%

Cape Town
%

Johannesburg
%

Unemployment

38.8

20.3

50.5

Formal Employment

36.5

45.7

30.7

Skilled manual work

9.2

12.7

7.0

Unskilled manual work

7.9

10.2

6.5

Office work

6.3

8.5

4.8

Professional

2.6

5.1

1.1

Domestic work

3.9

2.5

4.8

Farm work

3.6

3.4

3.8

Security

1.3

1.7

1.1

Health work

1.0

0.8

1.1

Mine work

0.7

0.8

0.5

Informal Employment

5.3

20.0

3.2

Other

11.5

9.1

12.4

Student

9.2

6.8

10.8

Formal business owner

1.3

0.8

1.6

Other occupation

1.0

2.5

0.0

Almost all of the in-depth interview respondents recounted how economic hardship,
unemployment and the difficulty of making ends meet prompted the move to South Africa. One
mentioned all of these drivers of migration but suggested there were significant ‘pull’ factors at
work as well, including the assistance of relatives already in South Africa and the prospect of
employment:
“I used to work at ZimPlats [a mining company] in Zimbabwe. The main reason why I
came here was because of inflation. The money in Zimbabwe was not buying anything
and life was tough. There was a rumour that stadiums had to be built for 2010 [for the
World Cup] so my aunt thought I would get a job opportunity. I already had a passport but
getting money for the visa was a problem because it was ZAR 2,000 [138 EUR] and that
was expensive given the financial crisis we had in Zimbabwe. So my aunt had to borrow
ZAR 1,500 [103 EUR] from a loan shark and my brother hustled another ZAR 700 [48
EUR] for the visa. The problem was that there was inflation and the Zimbabwean dollar
had lost power, it was not buying anything anymore. The money which I was earning was
equivalent to ZAR 300 [20 EUR] by 2008 and it was not enough. I just had to come here
to find something that would make me earn better.” (Johannesburg Interview No 3)
In the SAMP survey, as many as one half of the interviewees agreed that social networks (in the
form of family and friends) in South Africa played a role in their migration decision.
Just over 40% agreed that they had come to South Africa as asylum-seekers or refugees (Figure
7). This is a potentially confusing question since it is not completely clear whether this referred to
political persecution in Zimbabwe as a reason for migration. However, there was a marked
difference between Cape Town (62%) and Johannesburg (31%) which might indicate that
obtaining an asylum-seeker permit was easier in the former. Only a few of the in-depth
interviewees referred to political persecution, but those that did also referred to economic
conditions in Zimbabwe as the reason for migration. For example, one ex-schoolteacher, now in
Johannesburg, noted that “it was the politics it was also about working conditions and earning
peanuts” and continued:
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“Teachers became the target. Teachers were accused of supporting the opposition. I
was not in politics but you cannot avoid politics if you are a teacher. You talk about
history in class and you are accused of teaching politics. In 2008 things were tough. I was
accused of being an opposition agent. The youth visited me at school and I was harassed
and beaten in front of the other teachers and the students. That evening I just decided
enough was enough.” (Johannesburg Interview No. 2)
Very few (only 5%) of the SAMP survey interviewees were working in the Zimbabwean informal
economy prior to migrating, although this was more common amongst the Cape Town-based
migrants (23% versus only 3% in Johannesburg). Many of those who had prior informal sector
experience had prior experience of being in South Africa through involvement in informal crossborder trading:
“I used to come here as a trader from the early 2000s. I stopped in 2005 and came here
to South Africa to live. My business is about making and selling electric jugs and brooms.
I used to come here and sell them and go back home. There are some reasons why I
came to stay. One is that the economic situation was getting bad. The country was no
longer the same. I was selling things and not making much money. I wanted to build a
house in Zimbabwe and I was failing to do so. The cost of living was high. I had just
married and things were tough. Then there was the issue of politics. My wife was
harassed when I was in Johannesburg buying goods. They came and searched our
house and they found nothing. They wanted evidence that I was a sell-out, but they did
not find anything. My wife was pregnant so I saw that they could injure her if they came
back next time. That is when I moved to South Africa.” (Johannesburg Interview No. 4)
In this case, too, economic hardship and political harassment were factors in the decision to
move to South Africa. This, and other MICIC interviews, as well as the SAMP survey results,
make it clear that migration from Zimbabwe is also ‘mixed’ in the sense that individuals have a
mixture of motives for migration, as they responded to the multi-faceted nature of the economic
and political crisis in Zimbabwe.
There is an official and public perception in South Africa that the country is overrun with ‘illegal
foreigners’ (in the terminology of the 2002 Immigration Act.) Zimbabweans are viewed as
particularly guilty of being ‘border jumpers’ and in the country without proper documentation.
Given that most entrepreneurs operate in public spaces, however, there are considerable risks of
running a business without documents to present to the police who are constantly on the prowl for
‘illegal foreigners’ to arrest and deport, to confiscate goods from, or to demand bribes from. One
strategy adopted by traders without papers is to operate only ‘after hours’. In one part of Cape
Town, for example, there are very few Zimbabweans on the streets until late in the day. After the
police have gone home for the day, they open their mobile stores and begin operations. A much
less risky strategy is to have legal documents to present.
The SAMP survey found that relatively few of the Zimbabwean entrepreneurs did not have papers
of some sort permitting them to be in the country and even to legally work (Table 13). Just over
one-third of the migrants had asylum-seeker (Section 22) permits but only 5% had recognised
refugee status (Section 24 permits). Both asylum-seekers and refugees have a legal right to
work and earn. Around a quarter had work permits which the majority would have acquired under
the Zimbabwe Dispensation Programme (ZDP) in 2010 and 2014. Around 10% of the migrants
had visitor’s permits which are usually issued for 90 days at a time. Only 15% were
undocumented and did not have permits to reside and/or work in South Africa.
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Table 13: Immigration Status of Zimbabwean Entrepreneurs

Total
%

Cape Town
%

Johannesburg
%

Asylum-seeker permit

35.9

43.2

31.2

Work permit

24.7

17.8

29.0

Visitor’s permit

9.5

8.5

10.2

Refugee permit

5.3

8.5

3.2

Permanent resident

4.6

3.4

5.4

Undocumented

14.5

16.1

13.4

Other

2.3

0.8

3.3

No answer

3.1

1.6

4.3

Given that so few of the Zimbabwean migrants had prior business experience, and so many
came to South Africa to look for employment, it is important to know whether they moved straight
into the informal economy or tried to work in the formal sector first. A comparison of the dates of
migration and business establishment suggests that there is a lag between the two dates (Figure
8). For example, although three-quarters of the migrant entrepreneurs entered the country before
2010, only 47% of the businesses were established before that date. This also means that over
50% of the businesses were established after 2009. The rapid growth in the entry of
Zimbabweans into informal entrepreneurship could be a factor in the growing hostility against
foreign migrants in the country.

Figure 8: Comparison of Years of Migration and Business Establishment
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The related question is what migrants do in the period between arrival and informal business
start-up. As Table 14 suggests, just over one-quarter had experienced a period of unemployment,
although with significant inter-city difference (41% in Johannesburg and only 6% in Cape Town).
As many as 45% had worked in the formal economy with similar numbers and types of
employment in each city. The other major difference between the two groups was that 33% of
those in Cape Town had experience in another informal business compared with only 10% in
Johannesburg. Combining these figures with those for unemployment, we can infer that many
more migrants in Johannesburg are unemployed for a period (perhaps while looking for work) and
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then set up a business, while those in Cape Town move more quickly into the informal economy,
possibly because that was their reason for coming to Cape Town in the first place.
Table 14: Other Occupations in South Africa

Total
%

Cape Town
%

Johannesburg
%

27.6

5.9

41.4

Skilled manual work

6.9

9.3

5.4

Unskilled manual work

18.1

19.5

17.2

Office work

2.6

1.7

3.2

Professional

1.3

1.7

1.1

Domestic work

10.2

11.0

9.7

Farm work

2.6

5.1

1.1

Security

2.6

1.7

3.2

Health work

0.3

0.8

0.0

Mine work

0.7

0.8

0.5

Other Informal Employment

18.8

33.0

9.6

Student

2.6

0.8

3.8

Formal business owner

1.3

0.0

1.3

Other occupation

3.6

6.8

1.6

Unemployment
Formal Employment

Other

5.3.

Business Ownership and Expansion

The majority of the Zimbabwean migrant enterprises interviewed in the 2015 SAMP survey were
in the retail, trade and wholesale sector, followed by services and manufacturing, with slight
differences between the two cities (Figure 9). Migrants and refugees face severe obstacles in
117
accessing loans from formal sources in South Africa as they require collateral. Just over threequarters of the migrants relied on their personal savings to start their businesses (Table 15).
There was slightly greater reliance on personal savings by entrepreneurs in Johannesburg (87%)
than Cape Town (64%). More Zimbabwean migrants in Cape Town appear to be able to access
funds from relatives and non-relatives.
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Peberdy, S. (2016). International Migrants in South Africa’s Informal Economy. SAMP Migration Policy
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Figure 9: Sectoral Breakdown of Zimbabwean Migrant Businesses
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Table 15: Primary Sources of Start-Up Capital

Total
%

Cape Town
%

Johannesburg
%

Personal savings

78.0

64.4

86.6

Loan from relatives

9.2

13.6

6.5

Loan from non-relatives

6.6

15.3

1.1

Money lenders

2.0

1.7

2.2

Loan from informal financial institutions

2.0

1.7

2.2

Business credit (goods on terms)

0.7

0.0

1.1

Loan from micro-finance institution

0.3

0.8

0.0

Other source of capital

1.3

2.5

0.5

The majority of the businesses began with very little start-up capital (with 71% in Cape Town and
62% in Johannesburg having less than ZAR 5,000 (346 EUR)). Rather than being struggling
survivalists on the margins of the informal economy, however, the Zimbabwean entrepreneurs
have been relatively successful in their business operations as measured by (a) business
profitability and (b) enterprise growth. In terms of profitability, the survey interviewees estimated
their average profits at around ZAR 4,000 (276 EUR) per month. The average in Cape Town
(ZAR 4,166 (288 EUR) per month) was slightly more than in Johannesburg (ZAR 4,045 (280 EUR)
per month), although there are more low-profit enterprises in Johannesburg (with 27% earning
less than ZAR 1,000 (69 EUR) per month compared to only 4% in Cape Town) (Figure 10).
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Figure 10: Monthly Profit from Business Activities
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To measure business growth, we compared the start-up capital with the current value of the
business. In both cities, there appears to have been significant growth. In the case of the Cape
Town entrepreneurs, for example, 71% had less than ZAR 5,000 (346 EUR) in start-up capital but
only 23% valued their enterprise at less than ZAR 5,000 (346 EUR) in mid-2015 (Figure 11). In
Johannesburg, the equivalent figures were 62% and 33% (Figure 12). At the other end of the
spectrum, while only 2% of the Cape Town entrepreneurs had start-up capital in excess of ZAR
20,000 (1,384 EUR), 18% valued their business at more than ZAR 20,000 (1,384 EUR) in mid2015. Similarly, in Johannesburg, the figures were 7% and 27%.
Figure 11: Start-up Capital and Current Business Value in Cape Town
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Figure 12: Start-up Capital and Current Business Value in Johannesburg
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Remitting to Zimbabwe

Business expansion has occurred despite the prime obligation of the entrepreneurs to support
family still in crisis-ridden Zimbabwe. Instead of reinvesting all of the business profits into further
expansion, a portion is therefore diverted into remittance channels to Zimbabwe. Over one-third
of the entrepreneurs remit funds to Zimbabwe at least once a month and as many as three
quarters send remittances to Zimbabwe at least once per month and a few times per year (Figure
13). Only 12% never send remittances. The entrepreneurs remit an average of ZAR 8,473 (586
EUR) per annum. However, there were significant differences in remitting volume between the
two cities, with those based in Cape Town sending an average ZAR 10,217 (707 EUR) per
annum to Zimbabwe compared to an average ZAR 7,326 (501 EUR) per annum for those in
Johannesburg.
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Figure 13: Frequency of Sending Remittances to Zimbabwe
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Although not explicitly canvassed in either the SAMP survey or the MICIC interviews, informal
Zimbabwean remittance couriers (omalayisha) have established themselves as a major conduit
118
for remitting to Zimbabwe. Informal money operators such as the omalayisha command about
20% of the market share of remitting by these entrepreneurs (Figure 14). Traditionally, many
migrants have also taken remittances on their own trips back to Zimbabwe or sent them with
119
friends. However, Zimbabwean entrepreneurs in South Africa cannot afford to return home that
frequently and other formal channels (especially money-transfer companies) have now entered
the market. There is a significant difference between Johannesburg and Cape Town-based
entrepreneurs with regard to other channels. Probably because of the distances and costs
involved, those in Cape Town are less likely to take the funds themselves and send them with
friends or co-workers, and more likely to use the money transfer companies and banks.
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Thebe, V. (2010); Thebe, V. (2015).
Tevera, D. and Chikanda, A. (2009).
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Figure 14: Money Transfer Channels Used by Migrant Entrepreneurs
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Symptomatic of the high levels of food insecurity under crisis conditions in Zimbabwe, most of the
migrant entrepreneurs send funds for food purchase by the household (Table 16). Other major
uses including non-food household expenses, school fees, clothing and medical costs. There
appears to be very little investment of remittances in any kind of productive revenue-generating
120
activity in Zimbabwe, a finding consistent with research on remittance usage in general.
Table 16: Reasons for Remitting to Zimbabwe

Total
%

Cape Town
%

Johannesburg
%

Buy food

77.2

78.7

76.1

Meet other day to day household expenses

46.4

75.0

27.0

Pay educational/school fees

44.2

57.4

35.2

Buy clothes

34.1

41.7

28.9

Pay medical expenses

23.2

35.2

15.1

Build, maintain or renovate dwelling

19.9

19.4

20.1

For special events, e.g. weddings/funerals

18.0

26.9

11.9

Pay transportation costs

10.1

11.1

9.4

For savings/investment

7.9

4.6

10.1

Buy property

6.7

6.5

6.9

For agricultural inputs/ equipment

6.0

6.5

5.7

Note: Multiple response question

Several additional insights into the remitting behaviour of Zimbabwean migrant entrepreneurs
came from the in-depth interviews in Cape Town, Johannesburg and Polokwane:
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The majority of the interviewees said they remit funds regularly to family members still in
Zimbabwe and that these remittances are critical to their survival;
In a few cases, especially where most, or all, of the immediate family members have
joined the migrant in South Africa, remitting amounts and frequency have tailed off or

Tevera, D., Crush, J. and Chikanda, A. (2010).
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ceased altogether. This is consistent with a pattern first observed by Crush et al. and
Makina and Masenge that as migrants become more established in South Africa remitting
121
tends to decrease;
A number of interviewees mentioned the increasing difficulties of remitting goods –
including foodstuffs – to Zimbabwe (which is probably related to the Zimbabwean
government’s new restrictions on imports) and were now mostly sending cash;
Running a business in South Africa on a continuous basis means that personal
conveyance of remittances is not especially common. The omalayisha remain relatively
popular but a new remittance channel is also making its presence felt. Web-based
electronic money transfer companies were mentioned by a number of interviewees as the
122
easiest way to send funds. The two most used are Mukuru and Ecocash;

The obligation to remit is heightened by the crisis conditions in Zimbabwe but also means less
capital to reinvest in business expansion in South Africa. As one entrepreneur in Johannesburg
observed:
“All the money that I get just goes straight to support my children. There is no surplus to
put in the bank or to save for something big. What makes it even worse is being a single
mother. When you are husband and wife and you both work, at least you can plan and try
to save money for bigger things. Right now all I get is waiting to go somewhere; there are
school fees, rent, uniforms, food, clothing and other necessities. I cannot even save from
January to December and get something like ZAR 5,000 [346 EUR] to start something
better.” (Johannesburg Interview No. 1)
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Crush, J., Chikanda, A. and Tawodzera, G. (2015b). The Third Wave: Mixed Migration from Zimbabwe to
South Africa. Canadian Journal of African Studies 49: 363-382; Makina, D. and Masenge, A. (2015).
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6. Zimbabweans and the Crisis of Extreme Xenophobia
6.1.

Experiencing May 2008

All of the Zimbabwean entrepreneurs interviewed in depth for this project had either witnessed or
been the victim of xenophobic violence or both. The interviews focused on the experience and
impact of the xenophobic violence on those running businesses in Cape Town, Johannesburg
and Polokwane. Many of those interviewed had come to South Africa after the nationwide attacks
on migrants of May 2008 but none were unaware of it or did not know some of the victims. Those
who had been in the country at the time lost almost everything they had, but it did not mean a
permanent return to Zimbabwe. They took refuge in shelters and churches and re-started their
businesses once the worst of the violence was over. Three accounts in widely separated parts of
the country (Alexandra Park in Johannesburg, Imizamo Yethu in Cape Town and Mankweng in
Polokwane) illustrate both the destructive nature of the xenophobic violence and the responses of
the migrants:
“During the xenophobic attacks of 2008 I was there. My musika [shop] was destroyed.
People came marching and asking foreigners to leave… They came and destroyed the
musika. It was made up of cardboard and corrugated iron sheets. They destroyed it. The
cardboard was burnt and the corrugated sheets were taken and some of them thrown all
over. I lost a lot of money there. Maybe ZAR 3,000 [207 EUR]. I had a lot of goods and I
was also selling beans, groundnuts and even matemba [sardines] and fish. I lost everything.
I was only able to carry a few things and fled. Otherwise they would have killed me as well.
What could they do? The people that start the violence are the ones that can even kill you.
Many people died in Alex Park. They died. I actually saw a person who had been stoned to
death and he was lying there for a day without the police getting him.” (Johannesburg
Interview No. 13)
“I had just closed my spaza [informal shop] and had not even reached home when I saw
people singing and getting up here. They were coming from the direction of the police
station coming uphill. We had already heard of xenophobia and so I knew it was happening
here. I wanted to go back and get some things from the spaza but I was too late because
they were moving fast. I just had time to change direction and ended up in Hout Bay there.
There were other Zimbabweans who had also run away and were there. I joined them and
we went to Wynberg and stayed there at the police station. There were many of us. Like
me, most people had nothing because they never had time to go home and get clothes or
blankets. I called someone in Rosebank and they told us that they were staying at a church,
a Methodist church there so that is where we went. We spent three weeks there. My spaza
shop was looted. I never got anything back, not even a single sweet. They took everything
so I had to start from scratch.” (Cape Town Interview No. 20)
“I was living in Mankweng with two other ladies from Zimbabwe. We were renting a room in
Zone 2. We had been living there for some time and we knew most of the people there. But
when xenophobia erupted it was as if we had never lived there. We saw some of the
people that we knew actually looting things belonging to foreigners. We were confronted by
a group of young men – and they demanded money otherwise they would kill us. It was like
a dream. We could not believe it. We were robbed there, close to the road, where everyone
could see. They just took what they wanted and went away singing. I lost my bag, my
wallet and my friend also lost everything. I was scared that we could be killed or raped.
Even now I cannot believe that I survived. We went to the highway, the N1 and hiked to
Musina and then home to Zimbabwe. I only came back after a month when things had
calmed down. I stopped doing business for over a month. I had no money to start over. I
had to borrow some money and it took time to recover. Some of my customers moved with
my money and I never recovered the money. I had to start from scratch and it was difficult.”
(Polokwane Interview No. 3)
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6.2.

Narratives of Xenophobic Violence

Most of the respondents interviewed for the study recounted incidents of violence that had
personally affected them from 2008 onwards. These accounts revealed a number of features
common to most xenophobic attacks on migrant businesses. First, for the migrant entrepreneurs,
much of the violence seems to be spontaneous and therefore occurs without warning. They
therefore have little notice or ability to take evasive action. As one victim of violence in the
informal settlement of Diepsloot near Johannesburg in 2013 pointed out:
“They just occur haphazardly. We cannot always tell what happens next so it is difficult [to]
do anything and to think of a way to respond. It just happens when you are least aware of
the problems that are about to erupt. Sometimes we are caught up with all our wares and
they are destroyed and stolen and so it is difficult to do anything.” (Johannesburg Interview
No. 10)
The journalist, Anton Harber’s gritty portrait of Diepsloot paints a picture of a volatile and often
chaotic informal settlement in which vigilante justice and attacks on foreign-owned businesses
123
are common. In 2008, for example, “they showed no discrimination in targeting men, women
124
and children, and destroyed, looted and burnt down their businesses and houses”. However,
accounts of the unpredictability of xenophobic violence were also common in other areas.
Second, the perpetrators of the xenophobic violence are often from the same community and
even personally known to the victims:
“The people that robbed us are in this community and we know them. They are the
community members here. Some of the people here do not like us foreigners. They
pretend when you deal with them to like us. But they do not like us.” (Johannesburg
Interview No. 2)
The fact that migrant entrepreneurs are able to provide goods, including food, at competitive
prices and offer credit to consumers is clearly insufficient to insulate them. In one low-income
area of Cape Town, part of Khayelitsha, there is reportedly little violence as long as migrant
business-owners pay protection money to the powerful local taxi association. In many more areas,
the interviewees reported that community leaders are either ineffective in dealing with the
violence or, in some cases, actively foment hostility and instigate attacks. In Diepsloot, some
migrant traders entered into an agreement with their South African counterparts to keep out any
125
new migrants who came and established businesses in the area, in exchange for protection.
Third, looting and robbery of goods by opportunistic criminal elements are a constant element in
the narratives. As one observed:
“There are hard core thieves who rob people and also jobless people around who are
now taking advantage of these xenophobic attacks and robbing people to get money
because they have nothing to do with their lives.” (Johannesburg Interview No. 1)
However, the interviewees consistently maintain that robbery per se was not the prime motive for
the attacks. As one respondent noted:
“They target shops, the owners as well as the goods inside. They only target foreign
owned shops. There is more to that [than robbery], they want us to leave their country
because they hate our businesses here and they say we are finishing their jobs.”
(Johannesburg Interview No. 3)
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Others pointed to the fact that South African business owners in the same vicinity are left alone
during crowd violence, that attacks often involve vicious physical assaults against the person, and
that they are usually accompanied by strident xenophobic language:
“People were being beaten up and they were dying. A group of South Africans moved
around this whole squatter camp terrorising all foreigners and they used to move with
someone who knew where all foreigners stayed. These people moved with knobkerries,
metal sticks, sjamboks and any sort of weapon you can think of for distraction. If you
were a foreigner and did not have a passport they would beat you up.” (Johannesburg
Interview No. 3)
“The violence was there for two days or so and I thought it was over. I went to service a
car in Heiderveld. When I was coming back I passed through one of my friend’s place
and he accompanied me half way. When he had gone, and I was in Sisulu Street down
there, they attacked me with a plank and something like a rubber. They hit me all over
and even stomped on me. It was xenophobia. They told me that they would kill me and
that I was a foreigner and not wanted here. I cried and asked for them to leave me and
they continued. No-one intervened. It was past 8pm and there were still people moving
about. A few other guys joined in. I was saved by a car that passed, when its lights
flashed them they ran away. They told me that next time they would kill me.” (Cape Town
Interview No. 3)
“I was robbed in broad daylight here in Masiphumelele. It was not a real robbery, it was a
gang just saying foreigners must leave. I was about to park my car when the group of
men descended on me. They asked for my ID and I did not give them and when I said let
me go and get it, they pounced on me and started pushing me. My neighbours just
looked on. I asked what I had done but they were just singing derogatory songs. It was
pure xenophobia. Most of the locals here joined and wanted to chase me out. Even my
neighbours were caught up in that chaos and were told to go. You see, when there is a
small thing that happens, it ends up being that foreigners must be chased away. Is that
not xenophobia? Many times here I have been insulted only because I am a foreigner.
You ferry someone’s goods and they pay you little and the next time you want your
balance they start some story that you are a thief or so on and the others join in. Is that
not xenophobia? Why do they not do that to South Africans? Why only to foreigners?
These people have xenophobia in their blood.” (Cape Town Interview No. 13)
Fourth, many of the accounts in all three sites describe how a protest or march about government
service delivery would quickly disintegrate into mob violence and looting of shops and stores
owned by migrants. The connection between the two events is not immediately obvious but,
according to the interviewees, the looting is never indiscriminate but only targets migrants. The
reason, according to some, is that they become scapegoats for government failure to deliver
services:
“South Africans are not friendly. They say this is their country and they do what they want
to us, hurting us. These locals ask services from their government and if they are not
given them they demonstrate and if their concerns are not heard they put their
frustrations on foreigners. Most of them are uneducated so they think we are the cause of
their problem and when they see you in business they think you are taking over their
business. They target foreigners in business. They start with businesses and sometimes
when their concerns are not heard they even start attacking those not in business and
foreigners in their homes.” (Cape Town Interview No. 11)
Fifth, there was some evidence of ‘violent entrepreneurship’ involving attacks orchestrated by
South African competitors. One Zimbabwean entrepreneur in Polokwane, for example, described
how he had established a business selling and repairing cell phones. He said that his South
African competitors reported him to the police for dealing in stolen phones but his records showed
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that all his transactions were legitimate. According to him they had tried several times to get him
arrested. The reason? “They even tell me to my face that they want me out of this place because
I am a foreigner. How can they fail to make business when I as a foreigner is doing well? That is
their quarrel. Some have even organised thieves to rob me and I have been robbed twice.”
Sixth, xenophobic violence is gender-indiscriminate in that both male and female migrants
recounted equally harrowing stories. Lefko-Everett has argued that one of the most common
strategies adopted by Zimbabwean women migrants travelling to South Africa as cross-border
126
traders is to travel and stay in groups as a means of protection. Zimbabwean women living in
South Africa and selling on the streets are generally unable to benefit from group protection. One
woman in Johannesburg described her experience and sense of helplessness as follows:
“They were calling me names and some were telling me to go back to Zimbabwe saying I
would die that night. Some of the foreigners who were there and had been trying to
support me saw that the situation was getting serious and just disappeared. I lost most of
my goods that day as people just started taking them. The lady who was selling close to
me also lost her products as people just took and went. It was terrible. No-one was on
our side. They just did not care that we were females. They just harassed us. I even
thought of going back home that day. What sopped me is the thought of going back to
look at my kids without anything. And there was nothing that I would do in Zimbabwe.
Here we live with xenophobia every day. We see it happening and there is nothing that
we can do.” (Johannesburg Interview No. 10)
Seventh, the interviewees had different opinions on whether Zimbabweans were particular targets.
Most said that all foreign-owned businesses were targeted, not simply Zimbabweans. A number
commented that the type of business made a difference, with food and grocery shops being
especially vulnerable. Virtually all agreed on one point, however; the purpose of the attacks was
not simply to steal certain desirable goods but to clean them out and destroy their business
premises and operations so that they could not continue to function. There were numerous
examples of entrepreneurs who had lost all of their stock and also had their premises vandalised
and wrecked, even when they were operating from containers which are generally considered to
be the best form of protection:
“They broke and took away everything as if they don’t want one to be in business. If they
wanted goods only they would have just broke in and took stuff only but they destroyed,
breaking windows and even removing them and most people are not yet back on their
feet.” (Cape Town Interview No. 8)
“In 2011, the business was attacked by local people. The shop was attacked by the mob.
They looted everything and left me with almost nothing. I had goods worth over ZAR
15,000 [1,038 EUR] in here. Everything except some few bottles of cooking oil and
cigarettes remained. It almost destroyed my business. I was left with very little. I had not
saved much so it took me some time to be on my feet again. I had to borrow some
money from friends because I needed to restock. I cannot afford to stock much as I am
not sure what happens tomorrow. These days we no longer put everything here. Some of
the stock is at home so that if the steal here, I will have some of my stock at home to start
again. I just replenish what is in short supply here.” (Cape Town Interview No. 10)
“We had just brought stuff from Zimbabweans on a Sunday. They were worth about ZAR
10,000 [692 EUR] and included groundnuts (nyimo), sweet potatoes (mbambaira),
groundnuts (nzungu), matemba and we had also just stocked the local products. We had
bought a lot of crates like onions for about ZAR 15,000 [1,038 EUR]. All these products
were in the container and the container was destroyed. They upended it and spilled all
126
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the products that were inside to the ground. Some of the products were burnt, taken and
we were left with nothing. And because we had just stocked we didn’t have any money at
home so we had to start all over from scratch.” (Cape Town Interview No. 1)
Given the pervasive view amongst South African politicians that xenophobia does not even exist
in the country (see below), it is important to ask whether those affected by the violence agree.
Certainly, the term ‘xenophobia’ itself was used by all the interviewees to describe the
harassment and physical abuse they experience and some even referred to the widespread
violence in 2008 and 2015 as ‘the xenophobia’. However, they were also asked if they thought
South Africans were xenophobic and, if so, why. No-one answered the question in the negative. A
selection of responses clearly indicates that for Zimbabweans, South Africans are, indeed, the
“owners of xenophobia”:
“I can say that three quarters of them show their hatred towards us foreign nationals. They
don’t like us. Xenophobia is a South African thing. It happens more than anywhere in the
world I think. Everything they do shows it. They do not like us. They speak to us like we are
not like them. They look down upon us. They are like that whether they are Christians or
127
not. The children learn it from their parents. The call us makwerekwere. Do you know
even small kids can call you makwerekwere? Is that not xenophobic?” (Johannesburg
Interview No. 2)
“If you want to see how they hate us, just have a disagreement and they will tell you bad
things, telling you that you will die. What kind of a person wants to see another person
dying? Life is sacred, but here in South Africa no one seems to care about that. They
would rather you die so that they can get what you have. This is the only society where
people kill each other over very simple disagreements.” (Johannesburg Interview No. 10)
“You can see it almost every day in the train and other places when you pass they call you
derogatory names like makwerekwere. We can see it every day in our daily life and we live
with it. It does not only happen to people doing business, but it happens to any foreigner no
128
matter whom. If you can’t speak their language, you already are a kwerekwere and you
are in trouble.” (Cape Town Interview No. 4)
“There are many things that happen. The way they see us, they see us as if we are lesser
than them. They say bad things about us, like we are thieves and we are ugly and we do
not bath, such things. But they know most of these things are not true but they like saying
them anyway.” (Cape Town Interview No. 10)
“Is there a country in the world where foreigners are killed and burnt like here? No. South
Africa is a place like no other place. It is a country with people that do not care about other
people. Look at the way the kill foreigners. The way the chase foreigners and steal their
goods and injure them. That is not done by normal people. South Africans are xenophobic.
They do not fear evil spirits from the dead. They just kill and the next hour they are busy
braaing and singing and eating amagwinya. They are not normal people.” (Cape Town
Interview No. 12)
The language and practices of xenophobia cow the victims into silence and a sense of
helplessness, short of returning to Zimbabwe which is not seen as a viable option. As one
respondent said: “Here we live with xenophobia every day. We see it happening and there is
nothing that we can do” (Johannesburg Interview No. 10). And another: “I remain silent because I
am Zimbabwean and I can’t go against what they say. But they have to realise that we are the
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same we have the same skin as black people but we just keep quiet even as they insult us”
(Johannesburg Interview No. 12).

6.3.

Zimbabwean Migrant Reactions to Xenophobic Violence

The interviews conducted for this project provide important insights into how migrant
entrepreneurs themselves respond to the threat and reality of xenophobic violence. From the
responses of some of the migrants, it appears that trying to ‘fit in’ and integrate by learning local
129
languages, dress codes and cultural practices is one way to try and pre-empt attacks. However,
these strategies were no guarantee of protection when mob violence broke out:
“I was robbed during the day. There was a strike and I was coming from the shops. I was
not here the previous day and so I did not know that there was a strike. When they saw
me coming the mob ran to me. I was beaten and robbed. They knew I was a foreigner. I
can speak three local languages and I spoke in isiZulu but they knew me, some of them
and they said he is a Zimbabwean and they attacked me. If I was a local I was not going
to be attacked. I had ZAR 1,800 [124 EUR]. All was taken. That was my money that I had
collected from my customers. They robbed me because I was a Zimbabwean, a
foreigner.” (Johannesburg Interview No. 2)
A number of the interviewees argued that unlike some migrant groups, such as Somalis and
Ethiopians, Zimbabweans were not inclined to band together to form associations or groups to
lobby for and secure protection for their members. Indeed, some even went so far as to say that
they had lost goods to fellow Zimbabweans during some attacks. Why else, they reasoned, were
foodstuffs that only Zimbabweans liked to eat being looted?
A number suggested that there was safety in numbers and that by doing business in areas where
there were lots of other migrant businesses, the chances of being attacked were considerably
reduced. One respondent explained the attraction of running a business in the Johannesburg
CBD as follows: “You will find that incidences of xenophobic attacks are very rare in Joburg
central where they are a lot of foreigners. Also Park Station is a strategic location which supplies
the whole of South Africa so our protection as foreigners is better” (Johannesburg Interview No.
13). The downside of operating in such safer locations was that business competition is extremely
fierce.
Most were aware that a great deal of the xenophobic violence was confined to low-income areas,
particularly informal settlements (or ‘locations’ as the Zimbabweans called them). Some of the
most vicious xenophobic mob violence described by the interviewees occurred in informal
settlements such as Imizamo Yethu, Dunoon and Masimphumele in Cape Town and Diepsloot
and Orange Farm in Johannesburg. While it was possible for some to avoid doing business in
these areas, and operating in areas of the city where attacks were less frequent, this was not a
feasible option for all. Many Zimbabwean migrants to South Africa do not have the financial
resources to afford accommodation anywhere other than informal settlements and do not have
the means to run a business anywhere else.
A number of the interviewees noted that the unpredictability of the attacks made it difficult to ‘plan’
in advance. Some said that they made sure that they did not keep all of their stock at the place of
business, storing some of it at home or in rented containers. All tried to minimise the amount of
cash they kept on the premises, although not many Zimbabwean entrepreneurs have access to
formal banking facilities. One noted that as soon as he had made some money, he immediately
remitted it to Zimbabwe “so that even if I am attacked, there is nothing much that they can take
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from me. It is better if my family can have that money” (Polokwane Interview No. 6). Another said
that he was planning to relocate once he had sufficient capital saved up:
“Surely experience is the best teacher but I think you plan when you have money, so I am
thinking of saving a lot of money and looking for safer business locations like in town. I
am thinking so because in 2008 they also attacked my business. They just broke and
took away all my stuff, now they have burnt the structure down. So I re-constructed and
started again so I am now thinking how I am to keep myself and my stuff safe.” (Cape
Town Interview No. 15)
Various reactive strategies were mentioned when their businesses were attacked. These included
temporarily ceasing business operations, staying indoors at home, and moving to stay with
friends or relatives in other parts of the city “until the dust settled” as one put it. Others said that
the best strategy was simply to flee the area (or as one graphically put it “you run with your life”),
if possible taking some valuable item with them which they could later sell and restart the
business. None of the interviewees said that xenophobic attacks would put them permanently out
of business. On the contrary, most said they would simply raise the capital and start up again.
The logical implication of the determination to stay in business is that xenophobic violence has
failed in its two main aims: to drive migrant entrepreneurs out of business and to drive them out of
the country and back to Zimbabwe. The interviewees were asked if they would return to
Zimbabwe as a result of xenophobic attacks and the general consensus was that they would not.
A significant number noted that they had settled in South Africa with their families and did not
want to return. Many more made reference to the fact that the crisis in Zimbabwe meant that
there was nothing for them to return to, even if they wished to do so:
“There is nothing in Zimbabwe. I am not going back. I am trying to make my life here. My
wife is here and my child is here. I am not going back there. Zimbabwe is a country I love.
It’s just that at the moment things are tough and there is really nothing to do when you
return back home.” (Johannesburg Interview No. 11)
“While the hardships which I face in South Africa are many they are still better than the
hardships I endured back in Zimbabwe. In the event of future attacks, I could try and
survive because at least I will be doing something.” (Johannesburg Interview No. 13)
“I could never go back because there are no means of surviving. I could simply have to
look for an alternative way to survive while in South Africa. Even if they attack me I will
look for another means to survive as long as I am not dead.” (Johannesburg Interview No.
19)
“I am not going back. There is nothing to do in Zimbabwe especially because we left a
long time ago. What will we do there? So we stay here because this is where our life is.
We are establishing here and so if you leave you have to start again. I am not going back.
When xenophobia starts we simply move to areas that are safe and return when it is
quiet.” (Cape Town Interview No. 7)
Particularly relevant to this project is the impact of xenophobic violence on remitting behaviour.
Here there is a clear difference between Zimbabweans in wage employment and those running
businesses in the informal economy. The former are assured of a reasonably regular income
stream whereas the latter are not. Earnings are unpredictable and there are significant additional
operational costs (including payment of rent for business properties, transportation of goods for
sale, and transactional payments, such as bribes demanded by the police). All of these factors
mean that informal entrepreneurs tend to remit on an irregular basis and in varying amounts.
However, they (and their families in Zimbabwe) are particularly vulnerable to income and
remittance interruptions resulting from xenophobic violence. All of the interviewees whose
businesses had been victims of xenophobic violence were very clear about its negative impact on
their ability to remit and, by extension, on their family members in Zimbabwe. As one noted
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“obviously you will send less money home.” The specific impacts on family in Zimbabwe were
enumerated by others:
“They wouldn’t be able to eat or pay for school fees, so they can’t survive if I don’t send.”
(Johannesburg Interview No. 19)
“When people steal your property and prevent you from working, then the money you send is
reduced. The guy who refused to pay me affected me a lot. I could not send my mother
money for four months and it bothered me because my mother and sister want to eat.” (Cape
Town Interview No. 3)
“Xenophobia reduces the money I send. I had to save for some time to be able to send them
after the container was vandalised. If I stopped sending money they would starve. They do
not have another source of money. I am the one looking after them. I do everything I can to
make sure that they are okay.” (Cape Town Interview No. 9)
“When these attacks happen, they (relatives in Zimbabwe) are affected, especially when they
hear about these incidents. They will be worried about how we are surviving, that’s why they
keep phoning asking how things are because they will be having no source of income but we
tell them things are not okay and we are not going to do business. Like the last incident we
spent a week not going to work to do business. There was no transport and if you were seen
going to do business you were attacked and killed.” (Cape Town Interview No. 11)
“We give (money) and pay people going home to go and give it to our relatives. Maybe once
or twice a month since children are going to school. But since the shop was burnt down it’s
been difficult to send money back home. Even myself I am struggling to survive even to pay
rent.” (Cape Town Interview No. 15)
“I have to keep sending money and goods. That is why I am here. They cannot do well
without that money. I stopped remitting (during the xenophobic violence) because I had to go
back home. I went back without anything because it was not a planned return. So we had
problems but I returned as soon as the problem was over and people were getting back to the
communities.” (Polokwane Interview No. 3)
What these responses indicate is a lesson of broader importance for the study of migrants in
countries in crisis. Migrants caught up in a crisis in a country of destination do not always have
the option of returning to their home country. In the case of Zimbabweans in South Africa, return
is certainly physically possible but the migrants are making a different kind of calculation.
Zimbabwean migrants who encounter xenophobic violence in South Africa are forced to navigate
two crises in their sending and receiving countries simultaneously. Xenophobic violence creates a
double bind for affected migrants, who were confronted with two equally undesirable courses of
action. That is, go back to the economic freefall and political repression in Zimbabwe or continue
to face the constant risks of violence and discrimination by remaining in South Africa. If return
migration poses a cleft-stick for most migrants, those who have additionally faced persecution for
their political activities against the Zimbabwean regime are even less inclined to leave the relative
security of South Africa, even if it exposes them to other forms of violence. This reality has very
concrete implications for how both governments, as well as other stakeholders, might best
respond to the crisis.
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7. Stakeholder Responses to Xenophobic Violence
This section of the report examines governmental and non-governmental responses to the crisis
of xenophobia in South Africa. Three caveats are necessary. First, the discussion of the response
of some stakeholders is necessarily focused on responses to xenophobia and xenophobic
violence in general. Although these interventions may impact upon and benefit Zimbabwean
migrants, they are not specifically designed to benefit them. Second, where responses are
directed at Zimbabwean migrants, they rarely single out migrant entrepreneurs as a sub-category
although, again, the interventions may impact upon and benefit them. Third, few if any of the
migrants interviewed for this study reported receiving assistance from any of the stakeholders.
They are extremely critical of the perceived inaction of both the Zimbabwean and South African
governments and reported little if any contact with or help from non-governmental organisations
during or following episodes of xenophobic violence.

7.1.

Migrant Perceptions of Government (In)action

Building on the discussion in the previous sections of the report, it is first important to understand
the experience and perspective of the migrant entrepreneurs. All were therefore asked about the
response of the South African and Zimbabwean governments to xenophobic violence against
Zimbabweans. The responses ranged from the outright cynical to the totally dismissive. Not a
single respondent said they had been helped by either government and none were prepared to
defend the response of either to xenophobic violence in general. Most were extremely critical of
both. The general consensus was not that the governments did not do enough but rather that
they did nothing at all.
In the case of the Zimbabwean government, the prevailing sentiment was captured by one
Johannesburg respondent who said:
“The Zimbabwean government does nothing. I have never heard them comment or say
anything about these attacks. They do not help us at all. They do not send anyone to
come and see how we are living and even provide us with assistance. There is no
government that helps us.” (Johannesburg Interview No. 2)
Explanations for why the government ‘does nothing’ ranged from sheer disinterest in what
happened to Zimbabweans outside the country, a lack of resources to do anything to help, and a
desire to see Zimbabweans return home instead of staying in South Africa.
Far harsher criticism was reserved for the South African government’s practice of ‘doing nothing’:
“The South African government does not do anything. At least nothing that I know of.
They are just silent. We just see the police, but they come too late and do not do anything.
They do not arrest anyone even though you report. They are just moving about, but really
doing nothing. I sometimes think that even the police hate us the foreigners. Would they
do the same and not help if foreigners attack local people? No, they would arrest us. So
the police do not help us and would rather see us gone. Even the community leaders do
not do anything.” (Johannesburg Interview No. 2)
“Some of the people in government are fuelling xenophobia. They are also xenophobic
because they say a lot of things that are not true. Like we are the ones who are causing
problems here. They had problems here before we came. They are very corrupt but they
are the ones that tell people that foreigners are the cause of the problems. People listen
to the government. They keep saying that foreigners are bad. What do you expect the
people to do? The people follow their government.” (Cape Town Interview No. 5)
“They are the ones that cause it so they do not care. The one that occurred in Durban it
was the King who incited people. Now he is saying he did not do it but we all saw him on
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TV. The government does not care for us. They care about their people only. If it were
foreigners doing violence against the locals, we would all be in jail.” (Cape Town
Interview No. 6)
Even those who did not label the government’s reaction as xenophobic itself, felt that xenophobic
violence was tolerated because it supposedly achieved the desired effect of getting ‘foreigners’ to
leave the country.

7.2.

Response of Zimbabwean Government

How accurate are these criticisms of inaction articulated by the victims of xenophobic violence? In
the case of Zimbabwe, the fragilities of the sending state, the consequent inability to leverage
improved protection for its citizens in South Africa, and the conditions that produce large flows of
migrants and exposes them to such dangerous circumstances, are all critical determinants of the
response or lack thereof. Fragile states like Zimbabwe certainly possess very limited capacity and
resources to provide help and support to their citizens, when such situations arise. However, as
Koser argues, the Zimbabwean state seems to lack the political will to assist its citizens when
130
they have been stricken by emergencies in other countries.
In May 2008, the Zimbabwean consulate in Johannesburg indicated that the government was
organising voluntary repatriations. The time lag between the onset of emergency situations and
the establishments of consular assistance was also defended. The Zimbabwean government
eventually sent two trucks and ten buses to South Africa to transport those who wanted to be
131
repatriated. But, it is not known what other help this cash-strapped state provided to these
victims and how many of those who left remained in South Africa and for how long.
In 2015, six buses and a truck were sent to South Africa to repatriate Zimbabweans who wished
to leave and a total of 407 people, including women and children, returned to Zimbabwe. One
man described his reason for returning as follows:
“I watched my cousin being beheaded by a group of rowdy Zulus armed with machetes,
knives, knobkerries and guns who were toyi-toying, singing songs denouncing foreigners.
It seemed that the South African Police were laughing while my relative was being killed.
We were only helped by the Metro Police who took us to a camp where other
Zimbabweans were. As a result, I left my wife whose life I do not fear for as she is South
132
African. I fear for the lives of my children because these people were ruthless.”
While some traumatised migrants said they would never return to South Africa, most had little
choice, as there were few livelihood opportunities for them in Zimbabwe.
The Zimbabwean government equivocated in its public response to the xenophobic violence of
early 2015. When news of the attacks first broke, President Mugabe was actually on his first state
visit to South Africa with a business delegation, but he avoided publicly commenting on the
violence. Instead, playing to his hosts, he thanked South Africa for its hospitality and patience
towards those migrating without valid visas: “Naturally, that must be resolved, people moving
without passports into South Africa…We must find ways of controlling movement which is not
133
sanctioned”. An official statement released by the South African government about the visit

130

Koser, K. (2014). Non-Citizens Caught Up in Situations of Conflict, Violence and Disaster. In S. Martin, S.
Weerasinghe and A. Taylor (eds.), Humanitarian Crises and Migration: Causes, Consequences and
Responses (London: Routledge), pp. 267- 286.
131
VOA (30 May, 2008). Zimbabwe Offers Transportation to its South Africa Violence Victims. VOA News.
132
Ruwenda, I. and Muleya, T. (21 April, 2015). Xenophobia in SA: First Batch of Displaced Migrants Arrives
in Zimbabwe. Nehanda Radio.
133
Zimbabwe Independent (10, April 2015). Zim, SA Leaders Ignore Xenophobic Attacks.

50

reiterated Mugabe’s remarks on Zimbabwean ‘border-jumpers’ and went on to decry the
134
“thousands of Zimbabwean economic migrants” residing in the country.
Later, the Zimbabwean government strongly condemned the violence. In a formal address in
th
Harare to mark the country’s 35 independence anniversary, Mugabe expressed “shock and
disgust” at the xenophobic violence in KwaZulu-Natal and other locations in South Africa, and
calling for its immediate end: “The act of treating other Africans in that horrible way can never be
condoned by anyone. Our own African people on the African continent must be treated with
135
respect”. In an interview with the BBC, Information Minister Jonathan Moyo urged the South
African government to condemn the violence: “If you allow that [xenophobic violence] to happen
without condemning it outright, without condemning it unconditionally, you sow the seeds of
136
genocide”. However, after attending a summit of SADC leaders, President Mugabe reverted to
criticising migrants, reportedly noting that “people must go back to their own country. We, the
neighbours, should do whatever we can to prevent more people from going into South Africa and
137
get those who are in South Africa to get back home”.
In sum, the Zimbabwean government can be prodded into making critical statements about
xenophobic violence in South Africa, and providing some transportation for those who wish to
voluntarily return to Zimbabwe in moments of extreme crisis, as in May 2008 and January 2015.
However, little appears to have been said or done in the intervening years between 2008 and
2015 (or since) about ongoing xenophobic violence directed at Zimbabwean citizens and migrant
entrepreneurs in South Africa. Until recently, the Zimbabwean government viewed migrants who
had left the country very negatively and saw migration almost as a traitorous act. Harsh criticism
was often reserved for the many Zimbabweans in the diaspora, including in South Africa, despite
their central role in propping up the economy with remittances. This negative attitude has
certainly softened in the last year as the government devised a National Diaspora Policy which
138
was approved by Cabinet in June 2016. Whether this extends to an active concern with how
Zimbabweans are being treated in other countries remains to be seen.

7.3.

Response of South African Government
7.3.1. Responses to May 2008

A South African Human Rights Commission (SAHRC) investigation of the events of May 2008
argued that there had been little intervention by various levels of government in incidents of
139
xenophobic violence before 2008. Local police had a poor record of protecting migrants when
they were being attacked and negligible attention was paid to localised conflicts between locals
and non-citizens. Indeed, the situation had been allowed to escalate unchecked into a full-blown
crisis in May 2008. When the violence first unfolded, the South African government initially
140
ignored the situation and downplayed its significance.
By the end of May, however,
government could no longer disregard the very large number of displaced persons and the
mounting international criticism and negative publicity about its handling of the crisis. The army
141
was called in to quell the attacks and a state of emergency was declared.
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Subsequent studies of the responses of the South African government to the violence of 2008
highlight the many weaknesses in the governance of xenophobic violence and the emergency
142
management of displaced persons. As Everatt notes: “civil society organisations stepped into
the space created by government’s initial indecisiveness regarding the causes, nature and
143
appropriate way to respond to the conflagration”. The spontaneous mobilisation of civil society
organisations included anti-xenophobia marches in major cities and humanitarian assistance to
the displaced:
“When the violence struck, civil society organisations accessed and channelled resources,
provided food, shelter and other material assistance. Civil society mobilized hundreds of
people as volunteers. It pressurised government to intervene…. Many of the civil society
organisations working on the response had never worked together before. The civil
society response was diverse and plural in nature. It included NGOs, social movements,
community-based organisations (CBOs), civics, schools, women’s groups, peace and
justice organisations, academics, students, Christian, Jewish and Muslim faith-based
organisations (FBOs), refugee and migrant organisations, school governing bodies,
community policing forums, professional associations and trade unions. These diverse
groupings were brought together under several umbrellas which served different
purposes, from humanitarian aid to political activism. These organisations also put
144
pressure on political parties and constitutional institutions to intervene.”
In the displacement camps, NGOs provided services, psychological support, legal assistance,
education and advocacy, and lobbied to ensure standards of care. Civil society also mounted
legal challenges, including an attempt to prevent the closure of the camps. The legal action was
successful but was ignored by the state. One of the outcomes of civil society mobilisation was the
formation of new coalitions of organisations including the Durban Action Against Xenophobia
(DAAX), the Coalition Against Xenophobia, Racism, Ethnicism and Poverty (CAXREP), the
Coalition Against Xenophobia in Johannesburg, and the Social Justice Coalition (SJC) in Cape
Town.
In the months following May 2008, however, the momentum was quickly lost, which suggests that
civil society was quick to mobilise with humanitarian actions but slow to devise an effective and
145
ongoing responses to less dramatic but continuing acts of xenophobic violence. As a review of
the civil society response later noted, “the civil society response was an effective short-term
humanitarian intervention. After the immediacy of the crisis passed, the momentum created by
146
the crisis was lost”.
Although the South African government had some previous experience of dealing with large-scale
displacement caused by disasters such as floods, it had not handled such an emergency
147
involving attacks by its own citizens on non-citizens.
There was confusion over which
government department was responsible, especially since the mandate of the Department of
148
Home Affairs does not include welfare provisions required in emergency assistance.
Strict
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border management, which has been a cornerstone of immigration governance of the postapartheid state, continued during this volatile period, resulting in the forced deportation of some
violence-affected, displaced persons. Two months elapsed before the deportation of affected
migrants was halted.
Some have suggested that the attacks were not really xenophobic because South Africans were
equally at risk since and were amongst the fatalities. This view plays into a broader discourse
which suggests that migrant enterprises are no more at risk than their South African
149
counterparts. In May 2008, South African victims were probably cases of mistaken identity or
revenge attacks on South Africans who had rented property to migrants. There were certainly few
South Africans amongst the 100,000 displaced people who took shelter in makeshift camps
around the country. There was strong concern among non-governmental actors that the quality of
aid to the displaced migrants was inadequate and far below the prescribed minimum international
150
standard for disasters.
In a public statement, MSF noted that “after living in unacceptable
conditions for up to three weeks, the displaced people are now being relocated by the South
African government, without proper access to information about their rights and options, to sites
151
that are unprepared and insecure. They say they are being treated like animals”.
Camps
around the country for the displaced were closed by provincial governments in late 2008,
generating considerable controversy and opposition from migrants and human rights
152
organisations.
Critics of the South African government’s response to xenophobic violence tend to focus on the
ineffectiveness of its interventions:
“Systemic and deeply entrenched xenophobic attitudes and behavior in South Africa are
clear evidence that responses and interventions designed to address the problem have
been largely ineffective. National government and relevant local authorities have thus far
either tended to ignore the problem or to categorise violence against foreign nationals
and other forms of xenophobic behavior as part of ‘normal’ crime with no need for
153
additional targeted interventions.”
Although the South African government moved more swiftly in response to the escalating
xenophobic violence in early 2015, other lessons from May 2008 remained unaddressed. A
Counter-Xenophobia Unit (CXU) had been set up by the Department of Home Affairs in 2004 and
conducted some sporadic activities. In 2007 and 2008, for example, it reportedly investigated the
causes of xenophobia-related violence in several parts of the country and concluded that “the
major sources of violence were identified as lack of service delivery, unemployment, poverty,
154
competition for business and crime”. Ironically, given the name and mission of the CXU, no
mention was made of xenophobia itself. The CXU was eventually disbanded. The many
recommendations of the South African Human Rights Commission to different levels and
155
departments for tackling xenophobia in the aftermath of May 2008 were largely ignored.

7.3.2. Responses to 2015 Attacks
After the xenophobic violence broke out in early 2015, the highest levels of the South African
government initially became involved. A Press Release dated 19 April 2015 condemned the
“callous acts of violent attacks and looting that have been witnessed in the past week, particularly
149
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in KwaZuluNatal and recently in Gauteng” and unequivocally condemned “the maiming and killing
of our brothers and sisters from other parts of the continent. No amount of frustration or anger
156
can justify these attacks and looting of shops”. Amongst the ‘critical interventions’ listed in the
release were the following:
















Law enforcement agencies were doing “whatever it takes to restore law and order within
our communities.”
President Jacob Zuma had cancelled a visit to Indonesia and personally visited
“displaced foreign nationals” in Durban “to assure them of our support as government of
South Africa” and “spread the message of peace and tolerance.”
Zuma would lead a stakeholder outreach programme around the country to engage
communities.
Attacks on any fellow human beings and destruction of property as well as looting are
criminal offences and would not be tolerated.
Meetings would be held with church leaders to appeal to them to preach a message of
peace and to ask their followers not to take part in violence.
Meetings of government ministers with representatives of the African diplomatic
community were being held “to assure them of our commitment to ensure peaceful coexistence between South African citizens and people from other African nations who live
in South Africa.”
The Department of Social Development was providing food, shelter and other necessities
to displaced persons in shelters in both Gauteng and KwaZulu-Natal. Trauma counselling
and debriefing services were being provided to individuals on site at the shelters.
Government was working closely with civil society to provide all possible support to the
displaced as they await reintegration back into their communities.
Law enforcement officers were “working very hard” to ensure that those involved in acts
of violence were arrested, charged and convicted. A total of 307 suspects had been
arrested “in connection with attacks on foreigners and public violence across the
country.”
Condemnation of those using social media “to instil fear in different parts of the country”
by sending fictitious SMS and WhatsApp messages warning people of imminent attacks.
The National Joint Operational Centre (NATJOC) was operating on a 24-hour basis to
coordinate the government-wide response to this situation. Provincial Joint Operational
Structures (PROVJOCS) had been activated to monitor and curb any potential threats
across the nine provinces of the country.
A stern warning was issued “to those who lend themselves to acts of public violence. We
will find you and you will be dealt with to the full might of the law. You will be arrested and
sentenced accordingly. We warn especially young people as having a criminal record can
disrupt their lives. We urge people with information on plans to cause violence or those
who have witnessed acts of violence, to contact one of the operational centres, either in
the relevant province or at national level.”

There was no explicit mention of xenophobia at all in the official release. Instead there was an
assurance that “the overwhelming majority of South Africans are against the violent attacks
against our brother and sisters from other African countries” and it did say that government
“would address some of the issues that have been raised by communities.” In the weeks that
followed, it became clear that the communities referred to were all South Africans and that the
‘issues’ referred to were those raised by South Africans.
While the South African government had improved its management of xenophobic violence, it still
relied on a largely reactive strategy. Voluntary return was encouraged as the desirable course of
action by authorities in both 2008 and 2015. Unprepared to deal with an emergency situation on
this scale in 2008, South African authorities actively supported migrants’ decision to leave South
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Africa and facilitated their departure. After the violence of 2015, affected migrants without valid
status were asked to repatriate “voluntarily” to their country of origin as a condition for receiving
158
assistance at the temporary camps.
According to the SRG, the emphasis on voluntary
repatriation as an effective strategy to deal with displaced migrants runs the danger of conveying
the impression that “it is acceptable to attack migrants” as the “government will make sure that
159
they are assisted to leave South Africa”.
The major response to the 2015 violence was the establishment of an Inter-Ministerial Committee
on Migration (IMC) housed in the Presidency, and on which 15 government ministers sat. The
brief of the IMC was “to promote orderly and efficient migration and peaceful co-existence
between citizens and non-South Africans, as well as to consider social, economic and security
160
aspects of migration”.
An Ad Hoc Parliamentary Committee was also constituted by both
161
houses of parliament with the mandate to investigate the causes of the violence. The IMC
made its own findings known to the Ad Hoc Committee in a public briefing. According to the IMC:











The primary cause of the violence against foreign nationals was “increased competition
arising from the socio-economic circumstances in South Africa.” According to the IMC,
statistics showed “a growth in the number of unskilled immigrants entering the country
since 2008 … in the context of slowing economic growth and a decline in unskilled job
creation.”
Competition had been heightened by “a decade of poor implementation of immigration
and border controls” and that “if the underlying causes are not addressed there remained
a considerable latent potential for resurgence of violent anti-foreign national sentiments.”
The total number of migrants in the country was between five million and six million. It
was thus “highly likely” that immigrants represented more than 10% of the country's
population.
The reasons for increasing migration included “South Africa's relatively successful
economy; abuse of the asylum seeker and permit waivers systems; corruption in the
border environment and failed border coordination.”
Foreign nationals were placing a strain on government services such as health, housing,
education and social grants.
Foreign nationals were “dominating trade in certain sectors such as consumable goods in
informal settlements which has had a negative impact on unemployed and low skilled
South Africans.”
Challenges with the migration policy of the country included: that “no reservations were
made to international agreements unlike other countries” [sic]; that asylum seekers were
allowed to work; and “there being no provision to share the burdens of migration with
other African countries.”
Plans included “revisiting South Africa's unreserved accession to relevant UN
conventions and the related changes to the Refugees Act (No. 130 of 1998); measures to
track and trace those persons who had overstayed the allowed time on their permits;
decentralising Refuge Reception Centres at ports of entry to ensure “more restricted
movement for rapid and controlled processing of applications” and improvement of
borderline management “in terms of expedited construction and repair of border fences
and increased patrols.”

These unsubstantiated ‘findings’ – exaggerating the numbers of migrants in the country and
essentially blaming the violence on migrants and the poor enforcement of migration policy – were
compounded by the Minister’s observation at a press conference that “as the Inter-Ministerial
162
Committee, we've concluded that South Africans are not xenophobic”.
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The Committee concluded that “the main causes of the violent attacks were criminal actions that
started with stealing of goods from foreign owned spaza shops by South African criminals who
are often drug addicts. The spaza shop owners would react by shooting at those who steal from
their spaza shops using unregistered firearms rather than reporting to the police. When this
happens and someone is killed, local communities retaliate by looting spaza shops owned by
163
foreign nationals rather than reporting to the police”.

7.3.3. Operation Fiela
Government has the resources to implement its vision of what should be done and gave effect to
this in the form of the so-called Operation Fiela-Reclaim, launched by the IMC, in April 2015 in
the wake of the violence. Operation Fiela was described on the government website as “a
multidisciplinary interdepartmental operation aimed at eliminating criminality and general
lawlessness from our communities. As the word ‘Fiela’ means to sweep clean, we are ridding
communities of crime and criminals so that the people of South Africa can be and feel safe. The
ultimate objective of the operation is to create a safe and secure environment for all in South
164
Africa” (Government updates on Operation Fiela were posted online).
In practice, a critical component of Operation Fiela was a massive drive to harass migrant-owned
165
businesses, locate undocumented migrants and facilitate their deportation. By the end of 2015,
government could boast that Operation Fiela had searched 460,000 people, 151,000 vehicles
and 38,000 premises. A total of 41,000 arrests had also been made. Many of these were
migrants. The breakdown was not given but earlier, in July 2015, the largest number of arrests
166
were migrants, followed by persons arrested for drug possession. Between April and June of
2015, 10,242 migrants were deported, of which Zimbabweans constituted the second largest
167
group (3,051 migrants) after Mozambicans (3,691 persons). The absence of due process in the
militaristic implementation of Operation Fiela led Lawyers for Human Rights (LHR) to
(unsuccessfully) challenge the constitutionality of the way in which the Operation was being
conducted in the North Gauteng High Court in June 2015. An application for leave to appeal to
the Constitutional Court was dismissed in December 2016. In the interview with Lawyers for
Human Rights for this study, they reiterated their concerns:
“What we found astonishing was the Operation Fiela response from government. They
said the appropriate response (to xenophobia) is multi-agency enforcement to identify
and address and detain and deport undocumented migrants and the justification was that
South Africans are concerned about large numbers of undocumented migrants and
involvement in crime and threats to social cohesion. So the best way to address the issue
was to remove them. It emphasised the growing securitisation of migration – the
language they used was national security language and moved away from rights
language.”
What quickly became clear was that a particular target of Operation Fiela was the informal
economy and businesses owned by migrant entrepreneurs. In Cape Town, for example, just
before the global celebration of World Refugee Day, the police, army, traffic officials, and
immigration officials descended en masse on Cape Town’s Station deck (a taxi terminus and
market above Cape Town railway station). They closed the Deck for four hours and raided all the
stalls. Various informal traders described what transpired:
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“Yesterday was a big loss. We had prepared food that could not be delivered to our
customers as usual. No one was allowed to come in or out of the deck. Soldiers and
police had blocked all entrances and exit points. I have not yet paid my workers … Since
I started this business (selling pap and mutton stew) in 2010, I never let my workers down
when it comes to paying wages. When police got into my neighbour’s stall, they did not
168
find anything illegal. I am not sure why she was arrested.”
“There was police, army and immigration. They were looking for those people who live in
South Africa without documents. They asked me for my document: I take my passport
and showed them, and they left. I’ve been here for five years already. Nothing like this
has happened to me. Most of the people didn’t have their documents, and there was
nowhere to run – it was all over the place. I saw they arrested a woman, but she was
back here yesterday. She didn’t have her document on Saturday, but she maybe asked
her kids to bring it to the police so she could be released. The police are not wrong,
because you can’t live in a country without documents. But the army thing, I don’t
understand why they are here. They carry those guns like it’s war here. If you come to
search the people like that, it’s not good, because even today some shops didn’t open
169
because the people were worried about that.”
“It was really terrifying the manner in which they did [things] yesterday. Soldiers pointed
guns, ready to shoot anyone [who was] against what was happening. I was selling some
brand stuff, but these people went beyond that. Some of them were wicked. I could
neither question their authority nor do anything to stop them from taking my stuff. They
came in and took down all my stuff. They confiscated almost 50 items [including] jeans,
trousers and tops. Out of these items, less than ten were brand names. Yesterday was a
great loss, since the operation went into our busiest time of the day, between 10 and
11am… The unfortunate thing is they did not give us a receipt to show what they have
confiscated … I believe in a normal situation they issue a receipt … We did not get any
chance to talk to them regarding how we could go about [getting back] the goods
170
seized.”
In effect, Operation Fiela was a heavy-handed and high-profile effort on the part of government to
reassure South Africans that it was doing something about the ‘problem’ of migration from other
countries. There is no evidence on how many Zimbabweans, or Zimbabwean entrepreneurs,
were affected by this ‘show of strength’ but many probably were. The People’s Coalition Against
Xenophobia, a grouping of civil-society organisations, repeatedly criticised Operation Fiela as a
‘show of institutional xenophobia’.
With regard, specifically, to the violence against foreign-owned businesses, government has been
extremely responsive to arguments that these businesses are providing ‘unfair’ competition and
putting South Africans out of business. Whether this is actually true or not has never been
ascertained and research evidence about the positive economic impacts of migrant and refugee
business activity is strategically ignored. The Department of Trade and Industry developed and
171
published a National Informal Business Upliftment Strategy (or NIBUS) in 2013. The Strategy
includes a section on the “influx of foreigners into the informal business sector and ensuing
172
conflict with locals”. According to NIBUS, foreign-owned informal businesses are an “express
challenge” since there is “no regulatory restrictions in controlling the influx of foreigners (sic)” and
“no synergy between the DRI and Home Affairs in devising strategies and policies to control
173
foreign business activities.
The Deputy Minister of Trade and Industry, Elizabeth Thabete,
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sharply criticised South Africans for renting their properties to migrants by referring to “the
scourge of South Africans in townships selling and renting their businesses to foreigners
unfortunately does not assist us as government in our efforts to support and grow these informal
174
businesses”.
In 2014, a Department of Small Business Development was created to identify a strategy to
manage the informal sector and encourage small, medium and micro enterprise (SMME)
development. The Minister, Lindiwe Zulu, initially acknowledged the right of international migrants
to operate saying “They must make a living. The more they make a living, the more they
175
contribute to the economy. They pay taxes and are active participants in the economy”. But by
2015 she was arguing that “foreign business owners in SA’s townships cannot expect to co-exist
peacefully with local business owners unless they share their trade secrets”, and that “foreigners”
176
cannot “barricade themselves in and not share their practices with local business owners”.
Statements similarly critical of migrant entrepreneurs were made by the Co-Chair of the
Parliamentary Committee on Home Affairs investigating the xenophobic attacks in early 2015.
The Chair essentially blamed the victims for the attacks: "they roam, they go to townships to
177
occupy the economic space. We never invaded economic space in exile". The IMC briefed the
Committee and referred to the “business models used by migrants to discourage competition
such as forming monopolies, evading taxes, avoiding customs and selling illegal and expired
178
goods”.
The “criminalisation” of migrant-owned informal business reached its nadir with the tabling of the
179
Licensing of Businesses Bill in Parliament by the DTI in 2013.
The Bill specified that any
person involved in business activities would be required to have a licence to operate and that
licences would only be given to non-citizens who had acquired a refugee permit or a business
permit. According to the Immigration Act, business permits had to be applied for in the country of
origin and are only granted if the individual has ZAR 2,5 million (1,7 million EUR) to invest in
South Africa, effectively precluding any non-refugee migrants from operating in the informal
economy. Further, enforcement of the bill was delegated to the police and community
organisations, effectively encouraging South Africans to identify and help ‘root out’ foreign
owners. Defending the bill, the Minister of Trade and Industry, Robert Davies, claimed that the bill
was designed to stop illegal goods entering and being sold in the country. After a chorus of
protest, including from big business, the bill was withdrawn for redrafting in 2014. A new bill has
still not appeared and it is not clear if there will be one.
The national government has also supported provincial level efforts to curb informal migrant
entrepreneurship. In 2013, the Limpopo police launched Operation Hard Stick and closed over
600 informal businesses, detained the owners, confiscated their stock, imposed arbitrary fines for
trading without permits. The operation was successfully challenged by migrant associations and
human rights NGOs in the courts. The Limpopo Department of Economic Development was
supported in the Supreme Court by several national government departments in the case of
Somali Association of South Africa and Others, Environment and Tourism and Others. The
Associations’ affidavit claimed that the police actions “tell a story of the most naked form of
xenophobic discrimination and of the utter desperation experienced by the victims of that
180
discrimination”. The Supreme Court judgment observed that “one is left with the uneasy feeling
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that the stance adopted by the authorities in relation to the licensing of spaza shops and tuck181
shops was in order to induce foreign nationals who were destitute to leave our shores”.
Other provincial governments have been equally unwelcoming. Most extreme has been NorthWest Province where the premier, Supra Mahumapelo, announced in March 2016 that he wanted
all informal shops (spazas/tuck shops) in the province to be owned and operated by South
182
Africans only. Speaking at the official opening of the provincial house of traditional leadership
he observed:
“You would realise that the tuck shops for instance have been leased to foreign nationals,
so one of the things we want to attack, working with the traditional leaders is that people
183
must get back their shops.”
He proposed an investment of ZAR 200 million (13 million EUR) to establish and stock massive
warehouses in all four of the province's districts to assist South African business owners to
acquire stock. Similarly, in Gauteng, the MEC (Member of the Executive Council) for economic
development, Lebogang Maile, has reportedly embarked on a campaign to empower and help
sustain South African small businesses, suggesting that his department was bringing in large
private sector companies to forge partnerships with small business owners. The initiative was
reportedly “a direct response to a known business plan used by foreign traders, who club together
184
to buy their stock items in bulk for guaranteed discounts”.
In terms of the development of a broader national plan or strategy to address xenophobia and
xenophobic violence, there has been little progress. As long ago as 2001, at the Third World
Conference against Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance in
Durban, the South African government committed itself to developing a National Action Plan to
Combat Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance. This commitment
was not honoured until well after May 2008 and became the responsibility of the Department of
Justice and Constitutional Development. Successive drafts of the Draft Action Plan were
formulated and sent back by Cabinet. By the end of the process, the Justice Department
proposed to drop all references to xenophobia in the Action Plan. This proposal was resolutely
opposed by the non-governmental representatives on the responsible committee. The draft was
finally released for public comment in October 2015. It provides few concrete and no
comprehensive recommendations for dealing with xenophobic violence other than mentioning
various initiatives embarked on in 2015 and proposing better monitoring of borders and
185
immigration policy.
Following a series of public consultations, the South African government released a Green Paper
on International Migration in June 2016, proposing a major overhaul of the South African
186
immigration and refugee system. The Green Paper is an uneasy amalgam of control-oriented
recommendations (particularly proposals for restricting the rights of asylum-seekers) and
development-oriented recommendations (such as proposals for facilitating access to foreign skills
and a permit system for SADC nationals to work and run businesses in South Africa). On the
issue of xenophobia and xenophobic violence, the Green Paper is virtually silent.
The more general obstacle to the development of a national strategy on xenophobia has been the
consistent and very public refusal of government to admit that xenophobia even exists in South
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Africa and to detach xenophobic violence from prejudice, discrimination and intolerance.
2004, the Minister of Home Affairs had commented in Parliament:

187

In

“For us the scourge of xenophobia needs to be condemned, because it is based on
prejudice, is frequently violent, and most of the time, racist. There is no way that as the
188
South African government and as a nation we can tolerate or justify xenophobia.”
In the aftermath of May 2008, however, a new narrative emerged from government. The first
public statement of what has since hardened into the official position came when President Mbeki
publicly declared in a memorial service for the victims that xenophobia did not exist in South
Africa. After 2008, there was a marked tendency by South African politicians from the ruling party
to avoid the term xenophobia when referring to violence against migrants. This position had been,
and continues to be, reinforced on a regular basis by ministers and government spokespersons
each time anti-migrant and -refugee violence breaks out. In the wake of the violence of 2015, the
same argument was made.
Human Rights Watch has criticised the government of South Africa for failing to accept that “the
violence against the foreign nationals has been motivated by xenophobia” and describing it
189
instead as “pure acts of criminality”. A statement released by two prominent South African civil
society organisations contended that “for too long, South Africans in leadership positions have
190
either ignored the crisis [of xenophobia] or stoked the fires of hatred”. The evidence for ongoing
191
xenophobia denialism is overwhelming.
In 2015, President Zuma, for example, publicly
declared:
“We reiterate our view that South Africans are generally not xenophobic. If they were, we
would not have such a high number of foreign nationals who have been successfully
192
integrated into communities all over our country, in towns, cities and villages.”
At the African Union meeting in Johannesburg in June 2015, Zuma reiterated the government’s
position by arguing that “South Africans are not xenophobic. We do not believe that the actions of
193
a few out of more than 50 million citizens justify the label of xenophobia”. He went on to urge
the forum to collectively tackle the “challenge of migration, whether in SADC or in the North.” At
other regional platforms, too, he again focused on the supposedly abnormal, exceptional
character of migration to South Africa, focusing on the threat it poses to its citizens. At one point,
to justify this position, officials claimed that South Africa had over one million asylum-seekers,
more than any other country in the world. This was clearly erroneous and was later corrected
when the DHA clarified that their number did not refer to those currently awaiting a hearing bur
rather to the total number of people who had applied for asylum since the introduction of the 1998
194
Refugees Act. Less than 100,000 were actually awaiting adjudication in 2016.
Defense Minister Mapisa-Nqakula’s statement at a briefing on managing xenophobic violence (in
stark contrast to her stated position as Minister of Home Affairs in 2004) centred on migrant
187
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‘illegality’ and their criminal activities: “While government is going to be taking resolute actions
against South Africans who attack foreign nationals, we are equally determined to take action
195
against all foreign nationals who commit crime in our country”. The ANC’s Secretary-General,
Gwede Mantashe, openly blamed the rising numbers of migrants for the violence and the solution,
as expected, was the “tightening [of] immigration laws” and “if need be, establish refugee camps”
196
to geographically segregate migrants from citizens. As Davis has observed, “while the official
discourse is disapproving of xenophobia – when it admits it exists – there are frequent hints that
leaders privately share the concerns of aggrieved locals about the presence of foreigners in
197
South Africa”. The threat perception attached to migrants is very high and in such a situation,
migrants themselves are in constant danger of being blamed for the violent outbreaks. It was no
surprise, therefore, when the Zimbabwean migrants interviewed for this study all asserted that the
South African government was ‘doing nothing’ about xenophobic violence.

7.4.

Responses of South African Police to Xenophobia

A 2010 SAMP survey of South African attitudes towards migrants asked whether certain basic
rights, such as the right to police protection, should be extended to citizens, legal temporary
198
migrant workers, refugees and undocumented migrants in the country. As many as 90% felt
that police protection should ‘always’ be extended to South African citizens. However, only 54%
said it should ‘always’ be extended to legal migrants, 36% to refugees and only 21% to irregular
migrants. Fully half said that irregular migrants should ‘never’ enjoy police protection.
There is a long history of serious police misconduct in their dealings with migrants in South
199
Africa. Encouraged by their political and line bosses, the police tend to conflate crime-fighting
and migration enforcement. Arrests of migrants are reported along with crime statistics such as
murder, robbery and drug smuggling, just one sign of the criminalising of migration and migrants
in the country. However, enforcement itself is inconsistent and haphazard in a context where
bribery and corruption are commonplace. Demands for bribes from migrants and refugees are
commonplace, especially when the proffered alternative is arrest, confinement at Lindela holding
centre and summary deportation. According to one source, migrants are viewed by the police as
200
“mobile ATMs”. Misconduct extends to confiscating or destroying documents, unlawful entry of
premises, and use of ‘markers’ such as language proficiency, skin colour, pronunciation of words
and vaccination marks to identify and arrest ‘foreigners’. These practices are well-known to
migrants who develop a variety of strategies to avoid identification and arrest.
Misconduct for material gain is compounded by overtly xenophobic behaviour. High profile
incidents of malfeasance – including severe physical and verbal abuse – are penalised when
caught on video and because of the resultant media outcry, but many routine misdemeanours go
201
unpunished.
All of this is well-known and documented. According to a number of the
interviewees, particularly those selling on the streets, they experience almost continuous police
harassment:
195
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“They come at different times to disrupt our businesses. For instance, the metro (police)
can come and park their car right in front of where I sell and for the next hour or two I will
not be able to sell anything. Even if I decide to move to the other street, the metro will be
patrolling in those areas as well. Moving to a new area is a risk because you do not know
the place, the people who are there and how these metro people patrol. Some of them
come with so much hostility and I cannot do anything about it. If they tell me to move
away I have to move away and if they want to take my things I just let them.”
(Johannesburg Interview No. 1)
The same interviewee described how harassment for trading in certain places is compounded by
threats, theft, demands for bribes and arbitrary confiscation of goods:
“Sometimes the metro [municipal police] and [national] police can just come and take
your products. During winter they came and took socks and hats worth ZAR 20 [1,38
EUR]. Once you just try to confront them, they tell you that this is not your country, go
back to your country. I don’t really have the power to argue with them so I just let them be.
Tomorrow the same thing can happen again. The police officer will just come and say
they lost the gloves and take another pair. If they are in the mood of arresting people,
they will arrest you despite the fact that they took your things before. Some are those
who arrest you ask for a certain amount of money like ZAR 200 [13,8 EUR]. Maybe that
day you only made ZAR 50 [3,46 EUR]and if you try to explain that you don’t have the
money, they threaten to take all your stock. It will be up to me now the check the value of
the stock I am having at that moment in comparison to the ZAR 200 [13,8 EUR] they
wants. If the stock value is more than ZAR 200 [13,8 EUR] and I don’t have it, I am forced
to ask from other people. If they assist me, I give (to the police) and they go and if not,
they take all my stock.”
Many of the interviewees had similar stories of police harassment and misconduct. However, the
main focus in this report is on how the police respond during episodes of xenophobic violence or
in their aftermath: what kinds of protection do the police provide to migrants? And what happens
when Zimbabwean migrant entrepreneurs report looting and other crimes against their persons
and property to the police?
On the first question, a recurring theme was police inaction during episodes of mass xenophobic
violence. Some felt that the police were extremely slow to respond. As one respondent noted “the
police usually come late when everything has been done and people have been killed or their
goods stolen” (Cape Town Interview No. 5). Others commented on how the police offered no
protection even when they were present:
“Both the City of Cape Town and the Police are not protecting us at all. Like on the day
that the people were demonstrating, the police were there. They were just walking. After
they were passing, the people started taking our things. There was no one to protect us
and no one to stop those people. So, I don’t know what they are doing. I think they just
put on uniform and walk around. When there is trouble they don’t come to protect us.”
(Cape Town Interview No. 4)
“The police just stand at the robots. Or they run away. There is poor enforcement
because their response is very slow. Containers were being opened and things taken
while the police stared. They are either scared of the people or because it’s their own
people so they can’t stop them. There were three police vehicles, but they just stood
while people’s containers were being opened. Only foreign containers were broken and
they knew whose container it is. No containers for local Xhosas (South Africans) were
broken into and destroyed.” (Cape Town Interview No. 12)
One respondent felt that the reason for inaction was that “South Africans do not fear police” and
compared the police behaviour with that in Zimbabwe:
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“They throw stones at the police. Have you ever seen people throwing stones at the
police in Zimbabwe? No, they do not do that. Here they just do what they want. So they
attack foreigners even if the police are there. Unless the police are using teargas or
throwing water. But they rarely do that. But you can run to a police station if you are close
and seek refuge. There are other areas where the local people even attacked police
stations – attacked foreigners in police stations.” (Cape Town Interview No. 7)
On the second question, there was a pervasive view that there was little point reporting theft or
assault to the police because nothing was ever done, based on past experiences of police
inaction. Cases might be opened but the perpetrators were rarely arrested and brought to book
and stolen goods were rarely, if ever, recovered:
“It was the mob that took the things and what would I tell the police? Besides there were
many people whose goods were destroyed that I never bothered. The police do not help
much. It is useless to report to the police. The police here do not care. Especially if you
are a foreigner. They will just tell you it is a mob. They cannot arrest a mob.”
(Johannesburg Interview No. 2)
The argument that the police were not particularly concerned by what happened to ‘foreigners’
was very common:
“We just see the police, but they come too late and do not do anything. They do not
arrest anyone even though you report. They are just moving about, but really doing
nothing. I sometimes think that even the police hate us the foreigners. Would they do the
same and not help if foreigners attack local people? No, they would arrest us. So the
police do not help us and would rather see us gone.” (Johannesburg Interview No. 10)
One claimed that even if someone was arrested, “as soon as they have gone around the corner
they will ask or a bribe and release the person. As soon as the person is released they will either
come and shoot you or permanently injure you” (Johannesburg Interview No. 18). The police are
certainly held in very low esteem by Zimbabwean migrants. Another said that they had reported a
robbery to the police and even named the perpetrators but little was done to assist them:
“They took down my details and the details of the things I lost. I listed all of them and
went with them to the police station. I was told that they would call me when they have
made progress and that was that. I went back but there was no progress. The officer who
was dealing with the issue kept telling me there were no suspects and that there was
nothing they could do. I even gave them some names of the suspects because I had
seen some of them, but the police officer did not even take them down. He insisted that
there needed to be a witness for him to put those people as witnesses. I thought he
should have at least questioned them or gone to their homes and searched. Neither was
done.” (Polokwane Interview No. 4)
Apart from the failure to protect, in a xenophobic environment in which migrants are extremely
vulnerable, there is always the possibility that the police themselves might seek to take
advantage of the situation for their own personal gain. This was certainly the view of many of the
interviewees who described persistent police harassment, and even theft, during business hours.
Confiscation of stock appears to be relatively common and the owners are forced to pay large
fines to retrieve their goods. In many cases, the fines are so large that they simply abandon the
goods, borrow money and begin again. Simply to be allowed to operate in an area for a day or to
avoid impounding of goods may require payment of a bribe of up to ZAR 200 (13,8 EUR). Mobile
vendors play a continuous cat and mouse game with the police, ready to pack up their goods and
disappear at the first sign of a police car.
In sum, police protection cannot be counted on during episodes of mob violence and there is also
very little redress when individuals report crimes against their businesses or themselves to the
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police. Fear of reprisals from those whom they report or identify is also a very real disincentive to
getting the police involved. As a result, there is a certain fatalism and resignation to the
inevitability of losing goods and property in general or isolated attacks. The interviews with the
migrant business-owners clearly indicate that police protection is completely inadequate or nonexistent when xenophobic violence occurs.

7.5.

Responses of Other South African Stakeholders

There is a massive gulf between the views of the South African government and human rights
and civil society organisations, on the other, on the causes and remedies for xenophobic violence.
One (the government) argues that xenophobia does not exist; the other (civil society) argues that
it is a fundamental problem which has still not been adequately addressed.

7.5.1. NGO Views Concerning Xenophobic Violence
The views of civil society and human rights organisations about xenophobia include the following
representative statements:











The failure of South Africa to finalise a National Action Plan (NAP) to Combat Racism,
Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerances (first promised in 2001)
“contributed to denial and lack of action to combat xenophobia, particularly since the
outbreak of violence in 2008” (Consortium for Migrants and Refugees South Africa
202
(CoRMSA)).
The low rate of convictions and prosecutions for acts of violence against foreign nationals
and other hate crimes sends the message that there is impunity for such criminal
behaviour and is a contributing factor for on-going violence (CoRMSA).
There is a correlation between xenophobic sentiment, sexual violence and the impact it
has on the lives of foreign women in South Africa, leaving foreign women vulnerable with
little or no intervention from significant role players (Legal Resources Centre).
Xenophobia is a permanent presence in South Africa and there is a need to maintain
vigilance against xenophobia and, in particular, against any resurgence in violence
against foreign nationals (People’s Coalition Against Xenophobia).
Much of the resurgence of violence against foreign nationals in South Africa is due in part
to the failure, from within and outside of government to learn lessons from the attacks
which took place in May 2008. Since those attacks, there have been consistent and
continued attacks against foreign nationals, particularly shop-owners in our communities.
Reports and research conducted after the 2008 attacks, including by the Parliamentary
Task Force set up in 2008 and the South African Human Rights Commission, were not
taken forward in a meaningful way in order to combat the scourge of violence against
foreign nationals (People’s Coalition).
Public hearings should be held regarding past and future violence against foreign
nationals in order to create a national plan of action to end such violence and to address
the existence (and exploitation) of xenophobia in South African society resulting in
attacks which are used as part of attempts to remove foreign nationals from communities.
An independent process should take place through a process similar to that of the Truth
and Reconciliation Commission (People’s Coalition).
There remains a tendency within South African society as a whole, and within some
sectors of government in particular, to deny the existence of xenophobia and to reduce
attacks on foreign nationals to mere acts of criminality no different to any other such
criminal attacks against South Africans. Those who believe that xenophobia exists have
been publically accused of being mischievous and unpatriotic. The Coalition argued that
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denying xenophobia is very dangerous as it robs the country of the opportunity of finding
solutions to a very real problem (People’s Coalition).
A national dialogue should be created, perhaps through the same programme, to
promote a type of social cohesion which includes all members of the community,
including foreign nationals, breaks down misperceptions of foreign nationals, and
discourages xenophobic sentiments and statements as counter-productive to nationbuilding (People’s Coalition).
There is incitement to violence by persons in positions of authority. There is no
information on how authority figures who have made comments which led to violence and
played a role in perpetuating xenophobia and intolerance in the country have been dealt
with (Southern African Litigation Centre).
The South African government and the SAHRC should immediately take steps to
implement the recommendations in the SAHRC report on the 2008 xenophobic violence
(Southern African Litigation Centre).
Discrimination against foreign nationals by state officials in various sectors such as health
care, or public education, informs, shapes and perpetuates public sentiment. This
discrimination is reinforced by state officials who make public comments referring to
asylum seekers as illegitimate, equating foreign nationals with criminals, and referring to
foreign nationals as unworthy recipients of state resources (Scalabrini Centre).

Prominent human rights groups were extremely critical of the governmental response to
xenophobic violence in 2015 and, in particular, Operation Fiela which was viewed as an
incitement to xenophobia, if not xenophobic in itself:









MSF described it as a “festering contradiction”, sending conflicting messages to migrants
who remained vulnerable and deeply traumatised, just as it undermined the much203
required emphasis on “reconciliation, dialogue and reintegration to the general public”;
LHR characterised Operation Fiela as “state-sponsored xenophobia” and “institutional
xenophobia” which blurred stark differences between “criminals’ and migrants, while
deepening the divide between citizens and foreigners by bolstering negative perceptions,
204
instead of correcting them”.
Amnesty International said that the IMC was supposed to deal with the underlying causes
of tension “but instead they unleashed Operation Fiela and gave us statistics on how
many foreign nationals were arrested and how many criminals were arrested. A lot of
human rights violations were committed.” Because of Operation Fiela, the IMC “was not a
success” (Interview with Amnesty International).
The People’s Coalition Against Xenophobia noted that Operation Fiela was supposedly
both an anti-crime campaign and an attempt to combat xenophobia, but that “most of
these operations are happening in areas with a large number of foreign nationals and
most arrests are of undocumented migrants. The result is that an impression is being
created that all crime is being carried out by undocumented foreign nationals.” As a result
“far from combating xenophobia, these actions are feeding the xenophobic tendencies of
those South Africans who share the belief that all of our problems are caused by
205
migrants”.
CoRMSA described Operation Fiela as a “ridiculous response to xenophobia and
encouragement of the notion that foreigners are the problem and we can blame them –
which deflects from the real problem. Further, “taking it out on foreign nationals in
Operation Fiela gives the message that if we attack them then the government will take
them out – they are illegal and doing illegal activities – they’re seen as criminals”
(Interview with CoRMSA).
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Subsequent sections examine the responses of the major institutional non-governmental
stakeholders.

7.5.2. South African Human Rights Commission (SAHRC)
The SAHRC, an independent but government-funded body, has had a longstanding interest in the
problem of xenophobia in South Africa and has made various interventions over the years
including:













In 1998, the SAHRC released its Braamfontein Statement on Xenophobia which
condemned xenophobia as a violation of human rights;
In 1999, the SAHRC released an investigative report on rights abuse in the arrest and
206
detention of migrants (SAHRC, 1999);
In 1999, the SAHRC launched a ‘Roll Back Xenophobia Campaign: National Plan of
Action’ which was based on the fact that “South Africa needs to send out a strong
message that an irrational prejudice and hostility towards non-nationals is not acceptable
207
under any circumstances”. The Plan focused on six areas: the plight and rights of
refugees and asylum seekers; violence against foreign hawkers; violations of the rights of
migrant workers; the role of education; the conduct of police officers and civil servants;
and media coverage of refugees, asylum seekers and migrants. The Plan became
defunct in 2004 due to funding constraints.
In 2002, SAHRC made written inputs into government policy development around the
2002 Immigration Act. In the view of the SAHRC, the Act promoted and institutionalised
xenophobia and racism.
In 2004, the SAHRC conducted ‘Open Hearings on Xenophobia and Problems Related to
It’ in partnership with the Parliamentary Portfolio Committee on Foreign Affairs. SAHRC
concluded that it “had made a number of recommendations prior to 2008 that, if fully
208
implemented, might have mitigated the May crisis”.
In 2010, the SAHRC released the results of its investigation into the 2008 xenophobic
violence: ‘Report on the SAHRC Investigation into Issues of Rule of Law, Justice and
209
Impunity arising out of the 2008 Public Violence against Non-Nationals’. This damning
report made 20 major findings highly critical of all branches and levels of government and
over 100 concrete and wide-ranging recommendations for action by different government
departments including the Departments of Cooperative Governance and Traditional
Affairs, Education, Home Affairs, Human Settlements, Justice and Constitutional
Development, Social Development and local and provincial developments as well as the
South African Police Services, the South African National Defence Force and the SAHRC
210
itself.
A review of the recommendations shows that none specifically address
xenophobic violence against migrant-owned businesses.
In 2014, the SAHRC investigated conditions under which deportees were being held at
Lindela Reception Centre, following a complaint from MSF, Section27, Lawyers for
Human Rights and People Against Suffering, Oppression and Poverty (PASSOP) against
three government departments, the South African Police Service and a private company,
211
Bosasa.
In 2015, the SAHRC investigated the complaint of the African Diaspora Forum and 30
212
others about reportedly xenophobic statements attributed to the Zulu King Zwelithini.
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In sum, since the end of apartheid, the SAHRC has consistently advocated for change in the way
in which the South African government responds to xenophobia but has not specifically made any
recommendations about the causes of and remedies for xenophobic attacks against migrantowned small businesses. The general consensus seems to be that very few of the SAHRC’s
extensive list of recommendations to government arising from the May 2008 violence have been
implemented. There has certainly been no systematic evaluation of how government has
responded, although the Minister of Home Affairs claimed in Parliament in May 2015 that his
213
Department had implemented most of the SAHRC’s 19 recommendations.

7.5.3. Consortium for Refugees and Migrants in South Africa (CoRMSA)
CoRMSA is an advocacy consortium of South African NGOs and CSOs which has been a
consistent critic of government inaction on xenophobia for a number of years. Amongst its antixenophobia activities have been the following:






In 2008, in the aftermath of May 2008, CoRMSA, released a ‘Report on Protecting
Refugees, Asylum Seekers and Migrants in South Africa’. The report provided evidence
of “a long history of violence against non-nationals in South Africa without effective steps
being taken by various government departments to address this conflict.” The report
made general recommendations for dealing with xenophobia and the Zimbabwean
214
migration crisis.
In 2010, CoRMSA successfully launched a case against South African banks, seeking to
overturn the Financial Intelligence Centre’s (FIC’s) decision to advise banks against
opening accounts for asylum seekers and refugees or allowing them to transact on their
already existing accounts. The case (CoRMSA vs Absa and others) was successful. The
court ordered the banks to allow asylum seekers and refugees to open bank accounts.
In 2011, CoRMSA’s updated report commented that “South Africa’s inability to come to
terms with Zimbabwean migration continues to tarnish the country’s reputation and
reveals more fundamental questions about the commitment to protect non‐nationals
within its borders. While marketed as a generous offer to help Zimbabweans secure legal
status in South Africa, (the) ‘regularisation’ process was characterised by bureaucratic
ineptitude and dissimulation.” It notes that there have been ongoing attacks on
‘foreigners’ and looting of foreign-owned shops and expresses concern that “not enough
is being done at a local and national level to deal with cases that are attributed to mere
‘criminality’”. Further, that “while there have examples of swift and decisive response,
security responses have generally been late and reactive despite clear warning signs.
Where violence has occurred, we continue to see impunity, lack of accountability and
little effort to address the community leadership and local governance issues raised as
direct causes of the violence.” The report made a wide range of recommendations to
government departments including for categories of migrants such as labour migrants,
child migrants and migrant sex workers but not migrant-owned businesses, and does not
215
provide recommendations in that regard.

7.5.4. Lawyers for Human Rights (LHR) – South Africa
LHR have had a longstanding interest in migration and xenophobia in South Africa, dating back to
the 1990s. Its Refugee and Migrant Rights Programme (RMRP) is a “specialist programme that
advocates, strengthens and enforces the rights of asylum-seekers, refugees and other
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marginalised categories of migrants in South Africa”. Over the years, LHR has made a large
number of submissions to government departments, commissions of enquiry and parliamentary
committees. It is a member of CoRMSA and also has a Strategic Litigation Unit. LHR’s successes
in the courts have helped roll back some government policies and had a material impact on the
operating environment for migrant-owned businesses. The history of LHR and non-LHR litigation
suggests that greater use could be made of the courts. Previous cases of relevance to this report
217
include the following:










2002: Muriel Watchenuka and Another v Minister of Home Affairs and Others. High Court
(Western Cape) declared the prohibition on asylum-seekers working was unconstitutional
(non-LHR).
2003: Minister of Home Affairs v Muriel Watchenuka and Cape Town Refugee Centre.
The Watchenuka judgment was upheld by the Supreme Court of Appeal.
2004: Lawyers for Human Rights v Minister of Home Affairs. The Court rejected the
state’s argument that persons illegally in the country had no rights and were protected
only by international law.
2011: Zimbabwe Exiles Forum and Others v Minister of Home Affairs and Others. The
Court ruled against the state in the unlawful arrest and detention of Zimbabweans during
a protest in Pretoria.
2014: South African Informal Traders Forum and Others v City of Johannesburg and
Others; South African National Traders Retail Association v City of Johannesburg and
Others. The court ruled against the City of Johannesburg’s Operation Cleansweep (nonLHR case).
2014: Somali Association of South Africa and Others v Limpopo Department of Economic
Development Environment and Tourism and Others. The Supreme Court against the
state on the discriminatory targeting of foreign traders in Limpopo by police and the
Department of Home Affairs.
2016: Lawyers for Human Rights v Minister of Home Affairs and Others. The High Court
(Gauteng Division) found two sections of the Immigration Act of 2002 governing aspects
of detention and deportation unconstitutional.

7.5.5. People’s Coalition Against Xenophobia (PCAX)
The People’s Coalition was formed in response to the 2015 violence and comprises 11 South
African civil society organisations including Awethu, SECTION27, CoRMSA, Lawyers for Human
Rights, MSF, Corruption Watch, the African Diaspora Forum (ADF), the Nine Plus Unions and the
Treatment Action Campaign (TAC). The PCAX has organised anti-xenophobia protest marches
and in June 2016 launched a campaign against proposed amendments to the Refugees Act
which would confront asylum-seekers with deportation if they fail to apply for refugee status within
five days of entering the country and limit or prohibit them from working.

7.5.6. Other South African CSOs
A wide range of local non-governmental organisations, community-based organisations and faithbased groups have been exercised by the crisis of xenophobia and have mobilised on a
significant scale to offer humanitarian assistance to those victimised by xenophobic violence,
especially in 2008 and 2015. Frustrated by their inability to get the South African government to
acknowledge the reality of xenophobia and to implement effective prevention strategies, civil
society organisations have combined to appeal to regional bodies to pressure the South African
government to act. An open letter to the African Commission African Commission on Human and
People’s Rights (ACHPR) on 23 April 2015 urged it to “call upon the South African government to
take concrete steps to end (the) attacks, prosecute perpetrators and protect migrants and
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refugees living in their territory from violations of their human rights”.
129 civil society organisations from across the continent.

218

The letter was signed by

A notable development in the last few years has been the emergence of migrant associations and
traders associations to give voice to and advocate for the interests and rights of migrants and
refugees. The Somali and Ethiopian refugee communities in South Africa are particularly notable
for their organisation and activism. An African Diaspora Forum engages in various educational
and social cohesion activities and advocates for the rights of migrants and refugees in South
219
Africa.
Zimbabwe Exiles Forum is particularly active in Zimbabwe opposition politics in exile but also
220
seeks to protect the rights of Zimbabweans in South Africa. However, most of the interviewees
in the interviews for this project were not members of any association and several commented
that that was not something that Zimbabweans were interested in.
The role and impact of civil society has prompted a debate in the literature. Robins shows how
key civil society organisations reached well beyond their institutional mandates to mobilise
221
against xenophobia in 2008 and become involved in offering assistance to its victims. Everatt,
too, points to the rapid mobilisation of civil society as something not seen in South Africa since
222
the end of apartheid but concludes that the momentum quickly waned. But he also criticises
Landau and other contributors to Hassim et al. for supposedly decrying civil society mobilisation
223
against xenophobia as a form of middle-class angst.
Misago et al. argue that a fundamental weakness of civil society efforts to reduce xenophobic
violence has been a tendency to focus “almost exclusively on combatting anti-immigrant attitudes
rather than addressing the local and national structures, processes and politics in which practices
224
of exclusion are deeply embedded”. As a result, few CSOs can demonstrate “durable or broadbased impact.” Pugh takes a more nuanced approach and does not write off all civil society
225
interventions as focused solely on changing attitudes. However, she argues that the space for
civil society organisations to have a policy impact has been, and continues to be, slight as they
operate in the “constricted space” created by a national climate of anti-foreigner attitudes. As she
argues, “the works of both state and civil society actors alike are impacted by the negative social
constructions of migrant, refugee, and asylum seeker populations, which position migrants as
both a burden and unwanted competition to the rights and well-being of South African citizens.
While rights-based advocacy is a common approach for both CSOs and sympathetic policy- and
decision-makers, the social and political realities of South Africa continue to inform a de facto
hierarchy of rights, in which the issues and needs of South African citizens are, in practice,
226
positioned above those of migrants, refugees, and asylum seekers”.
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7.6.

Responses of International Stakeholders
7.6.1. UNHCR

The UNHCR’s response to xenophobia in South Africa is guided by the organisation’s 2009
‘South African Plan of Action and Status Report’. The UNHCR’s current anti-xenophobia
programming was the subject of an independent evaluation commissioned by the UNHCR
227
itself. The report noted that “combatting xenophobia, particularly preventing violent attacks,
228
does not naturally fall into UNHCR’s traditional protection mandate”.
While the evaluation
praised UNHCR’s “tremendous efforts” at addressing xenophobia by supporting programmes and
activities to protect refugees, these strategies, partnerships and supported programmes have not
229
provided “effective and sustainable protection”.
Beyond its own specific programming, UNHCR established a ‘xenophobia emergency hotline’
through a partnership with the South African Police Services (SAPS) and chairs a Protection
Working Group (PWG) which meets regularly and brings together UN agencies, international and
local NGOs, faith based organisations, trade unions, government and police representatives and
donors. The Group deals with all protection issues, including xenophobia.
The evaluation notes that the PWG has been useful in making new partnerships but that it “does
not seem to have resulted in the coordination of various anti-xenophobia programmes among
230
group members or even among UNHCR implementing partners”. The report concludes with 15
recommendations for UNHCR including developing an operational strategy, engaging the South
African government in that strategy, creating advocacy networks, redesigning the role and
functions of the PWG, creating an evidence base and capacity-building. Unfortunately, none of
the recommendations specifically refer to how UNHCR might intervene in growing xenophobic
violence against informal enterprises.
UNHCR partners with several NGOs to provide livelihood (including small business support) in
several centres including in Cape Town where it funds the Cape Town Refugee Centre’s (CTRC)
Self-Reliance Programme to improve skilled refugees' access to formal employment through the
evaluation of qualifications, advocate for refugees’ right to work and operate informal businesses,
and provide business skills training and start-up grants of ZAR 4,000–10,000 (276 – 692 EUR) to
refugees and asylum seekers to open micro and small businesses. Similar support programmes
exist with NGOs in Port Elizabeth, Durban and Musina.
UNHCR is moving away from grants towards a system of loans and issuing start-up kits despite
the success of these support programmes. Most of those assisted are Somalis or Congolese.
Since so few Zimbabweans have refugee status, they are generally not eligible for support and
none of the Zimbabwean interviewees on this project had received assistance or, indeed, had any
contact at all with the UNHCR.

7.6.2. International Organization for Migration (IOM) – South Africa
The IOM has operated in South Africa since the mid-1990s and has mounted a series of
migration-related programmes with implications for Zimbabwean migration to South Africa and
the crisis of xenophobia over the years. The establishment of a Migrant Reception Centre at the
South Africa–Zimbabwe border at Beitbridge in 2006 to provide advice and support to
Zimbabweans deported from South Africa caused considerable controversy. The IOM was
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criticised by Human Rights Watch for complicity in mass deportations.
In 2016, the
controversial reception centre was handed over to the Zimbabwean Departments of Social
Services and Child Welfare. Other recent IOM interventions include the following:














In late 2009, the IOM launched a ‘One Movement’ anti-xenophobia campaign under the
patronage of Desmond Tutu, to use “media campaigns, community conversations, youth
mobilisation, curriculum interventions and human rights training with a wide range of civil
society partners to promote a culture of tolerance, human dignity and unity in diversity
232
across Southern Africa”.
No evaluation of the activities or achievements of this
campaign is available although the initiative no longer exists.
In 2012 IOM, in partnership with UNHCR and the City of Johannesburg, launched an ‘I
Am A Migrant Too’ campaign “aimed at sensitising the South African public to the fact
233
that migrants are an integral part of South African society”. Among its products were a
song, a comic book and book of poetry.
In November 2016, IOM announced a partnership with the Mkhaya Migrants Awards
Program of the Department of Home Affairs in an essay-writing competition on the topic
‘Migrants’ Contribution to Our Communities, Country and Continent’. The prize for the ten
winners includes an expenses-paid trip to the African Union headquarters in Addis
Ababa.
In an interview for this project (Annex B), a representative from IOM’s mission to South
Africa noted that IOM’s current strategy has three parts. First, IOM assists in the
voluntary return of migrants. It avoided participation in “facilitated return” (such as the
provision of buses to take Zimbabweans back to Zimbabwe) because the approach is
“largely misguided” and “not sustainable”. Instead, IOM has advocated with the South
African government for a policy of “assisted voluntary return and reintegration” (AVRR).
At the same time, IOM recognises that “this is a policy which would be more productive,
(but) it will be unpopular with South Africans.”
Second, IOM is concerned about the “pre-departure phase” including “sharing the
realities of the process of migration.” Based on our interviews, traditional IOM campaigns
focused on the risks and dangers of migration would be “ineffective and money wasted.”
Instead, attention will focus on “letting people know that the perceptions they have of
South Africa are mistaken – that it is very difficult to make a living and that you will be
disappointed.” The methodology will be to rely on those who have been to South Africa
as migrants to tell their stories of hardship.
In its third action area, IOM plans to focus on informal settlements in South Africa and
“taking away the tension between host and migrants” through creating job opportunities,
and improving access to health care, security and education. Exactly what this would
entail is currently unspecified although IOM is proposing it as a “whole of UN approach”
in partnership with other UN agencies.
IOM Zimbabwe has a range of programmes designed to assist the Zimbabwean
234
government in migration management, anti-trafficking and policy development.
An
independent evaluation of IOM’s anti-xenophobia programmes, along the same lines as
the UNHCR evaluation, would be extremely useful in determining whether or not they
have had any impact.
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7.6.3. International Labour Organization (ILO)
The ILO has assumed an increasingly larger presence in Southern Africa over the last decade. It
has been particularly active in tripartite projects, such as the South African Decent Work Country
Programme, directed at documenting and improving the working conditions and rights of migrant
workers in sectors such as mining, agriculture and domestic work. Since many Zimbabweans
work in these three sectors, the ILO’s programmes do stand to benefit workers in those sectors.
In terms specifically of interventions in the informal economy, the ILO more generally obviously
has a longstanding interest in this area and the South African office has been involved in various
initiatives. These include the following:
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‘Private and Public Procurement and the Social Economy (PPPSE) Project’. A review
of best practice interventions profiles six different community-based social enterprises but
there is no mention of any participation by migrants. Similarly, a recent ILO scoping
review of access to finance by social enterprises does not mention migrant-owned
236
businesses and the particular difficulties they face.
The ILO has recently co-hosted two National Informal Economy summits with local
government and the national Department of Labour. The first, in November 2010,
focused on ‘Managing the Informal Economy: A key service delivery function for Local
Government’. The second, in June 2016, had the theme ‘Uplifting the Informal Economy
and Creating Pathways to Formalisation’ which is consistent with the ILO’s general policy
push on formalising the informal. As far as can be ascertained from the programmes and
proceedings the role of migrants in the informal economy was ignored and xenophobic
attacks not addressed either. A representative from ILO noted in an interview that one of
the parallel sessions was a dialogue between migrant and national informal economy
operators.

7.6.4. Amnesty International – South Africa
Amnesty International South Africa (AISA)’s work under its Discrimination and Equality
Programme focuses on the protection and promotion of the human rights of marginalised groups
and persons including asylum seekers, refugees, and migrants. AISA is firm in its position that
“xenophobia is a constant threat facing many asylum seekers, refugees on a daily basis”
(Interview with AISA). The Programme focuses on addressing violence and discrimination
targeting these groups including the introduction of hate crimes legislation and lobbying for other
protective policy and/or legislative frameworks. AISA also sat on the committee developing the
National Action Plan on Racism and Xenophobia, and resisted attempts to drop xenophobia from
the plan.

7.6.5. European Union
Information on European Union interventions comes from an interview with a member of the EU
Delegation. The Delegation is working with refugee organisations as part of its human rights
funding to build advocacy capacity and has supported the South African Human Rights
th
Commission’s 20 anniversary event. The EU is also involved in the development of the ‘National
Action Plan on Racism and Xenophobia’.

7.6.6. African Union
The AU’s African Peer Review Mechanism Monitoring Project has consistently criticised South
Africa over its handling of xenophobia. In its 2011 report, for example, the AU Project gave South
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Africa a “red rating” for its failure to address, and its denial of, xenophobia. In 2015, the AU’s
African Commission on Human and People’s Rights adopted a resolution against the violence in
238
South Africa.
The Resolution requested that the South African government ensure that
mechanisms were put in place to prevent xenophobia from reoccurring and urged South Africa to
respect its obligations under the African Charter. Adeola makes the point that xenophobia is not
unique to South Africa in the African context and argues that “the issue of xenophobia is a
pressing challenge that cuts across human rights, governance, development and democracy in
Africa. As it is not specific to one African state, an Africa-wide response is essential. Within this
239
context, the role of the AU is primary”. He argues that seven institutions within the AU should
develop a coordinated response to the issue of xenophobia in Africa. He does not suggest that
the AU or any member governments should look to South Africa for “best practice” solutions for,
indeed, it is hard to locate any.
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8. Conclusions and Recommendations
This case study of the double crisis of mass migration from Zimbabwe and xenophobia in South
Africa has aimed to make a number of contributions to the literature on migration in countries in
crisis. First, it focuses on a crisis that is intrinsic to the migration process itself and, furthermore,
only affects migrants; that is, the crisis of anti-migrant intolerance and xenophobic violence in
South Africa. Xenophobia, by definition, is targeted at migrants and assumes crisis proportions
when it manifests in extreme xenophobia; that is, both acute and chronic forms of violence
against migrants. Migrants are the direct victims of this crisis and are forced to make a whole set
of choices to mitigate, ameliorate or escape the tide of hostility and hatred that they are forced to
confront on an almost daily basis. Extreme xenophobia in South Africa is increasingly manifesting
itself in attacks on informal migrant entrepreneurs which raises the critical question of how
xenophobia disrupts and destroys business activities and livelihoods, on the one hand, and what
options and strategies are available to migrants under attack. However, anti-migrant intolerance
and xenophobia is not confined to South Africa and, indeed, is spreading in both the global South
and North. South Africa regrettably offers other jurisdictions a mirror of their own future if they fail
to acknowledge the reality of xenophobia and counter its devastating effects.
Second, the study focuses on a situation of double bind, that is, when the migrants leave a
country in crisis and are then caught up in a crisis in the host country. One of the most common
responses to crisis situations in a destination state is for migrants to return temporarily or
permanently to their country of origin. The calculation of how to respond becomes a very different
one when return is not necessarily a viable or sustainable option because of crisis conditions in
the country of origin. The key question in relation to the crisis of extreme xenophobia in South
Africa is whether return is actually a viable option for Zimbabweans. As this report clearly
demonstrates, return is not a viable option for Zimbabwean migrants in South Africa because the
alternative livelihood opportunities in Zimbabwe itself are virtually non-existent. At the same time,
remittances to Zimbabwe from migrants are critical to the survival of those who remain.
Xenophobic violence can cut off the flow of remittances and impact not only on those immediately
affected but those who depend on a regular and stable transfer of cash and goods.
Third, there is the question of whether there is any causal connection between increased
migration flows to South Africa and extreme xenophobic violence. In other words, does an
increase in migration to the country and a particular community heighten everyday xenophobia
and set the stage for acts of extreme xenophobia? And since Zimbabweans are easily the largest
group of migrants by nationality, are they more likely to be the victims of xenophobic violence
than migrants from other countries with less visibility? Attitudinal surveys show that Zimbabweans
are intensely disliked by the majority of South Africans and that this translates into a particular
form of verbal loathing. The most noteworthy shift in the targets of xenophobic violence since
2008 is migrants in general to migrants running businesses in the informal economy. Because
increasing numbers of Zimbabweans work in the informal economy, they have, by definition,
become more vulnerable to attack. Narratives of the migrants themselves collected for this project
paint a desperate picture but also of resolve, determination and the drive to begin again when
their businesses are reduced to ashes.
Fourth, there is the issue of whether extreme xenophobia acts as a disincentive to further
migration to South Africa. This certainly seems to be the belief in some official circles in South
Africa. Friebel et al. provide some evidential support for this, arguing that xenophobic violence
provides a dampening effect on migration from Mozambique which is mitigated by the strength of
240
a potential migrant’s social networks in South Africa.
There was no noticeable decline in
migration from Zimbabwe after 2008 which seems to suggest that the xenophobic violence did
not dissuade Zimbabweans from migrating to South Africa in the same way as in Mozambique.
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The difference between Mozambique and Zimbabwe may be that in the former there are viable
alternative livelihood strategies to migration, which simply do not exist in the latter.
Fifth, since the primary focus of this research project is the crisis of xenophobia in South Africa, it
is important to understand how the two governments (South African and Zimbabwean) have
responded to xenophobia in general and the rash of extreme xenophobia in particular. From the
perspective of the victims of xenophobic violence, it is clear that the overwhelming impression is
that governments do nothing to help and do nothing to mitigate the problem. Particular criticism is
reserved for the police and their failure to protect or punish. Police behaviour, as experienced by
the migrants, simply makes them more vulnerable and is clearly motivated itself by xenophobic
attitudes. Most evident, at a policy level, is the repeated denialism of the South African
government at all levels. This position does a great deal more harm than good. If there is no
xenophobia, there is no problem to address. The first step for any government wishing to rid a
country of the plague of xenophobia is actually to admit that there is a serious disease.
Sixth, there are other local and international stakeholders in South Africa who do recognise the
reality of xenophobia and attempt to intervene or ameliorate the crisis. These include migrant
associations, non-governmental organisations, civil society organisations, faith-based
organisations, international organisations with a strong local presence and the representatives of
other governments and regional bodies. While these organisations are increasingly combining
and working in concert, their impact on government policy is extremely constrained. On the
contrary, they are more often working against government in the courts to protect the
constitutional and other rights of migrants. Collaboration and cooperation is essential to achieve
any progress but it is clear that most increasingly feel that the best approach is to work at the
community-level in xenophobia hotspots. Many of these programmes are in their infancy and
certainly none of the migrants interviewed in this project had any knowledge or contact with any
of them.
Finally, while the growing presence of Zimbabweans and other migrants in the informal economy
may be disruptive to established South African business-owners, a persistent challenge here is
that migration itself is treated as an aberrant process harmful to those who are at its receiving end,
even if it is undertaken due to exceptional circumstances, as is the case for Zimbabweans. The
urgent need to discuss and implement concrete ways to address xenophobia and also broader
circumstances which precipitated the exodus of forced migrants from this country are shrunk
down in a restrictive manner to limiting migrants’ entry and amplifying border controls. By doing
so, a consistent, if troubling message is transmitted, that migrants contribute to xenophobic
tendencies by their mere existence in receiving states like South Africa. Such a belief also
undercuts the human rights of migrants and their right to be fully integrated into South African
241
society.
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10. Annexes
Annex A: Interviews with Zimbabwean Migrants
A. Johannesburg

No.

J1
J2
J3
J4
J5
J6
J7
J8
J9
J10
J11
J12
J13
J14
J15
J16
J17
J18
J19
J20

Date of Interview

14 Aug 2016
15 Aug 2016
14 Aug 2016
15 Aug 2016
16 Aug 2016
Incomplete
14 Aug 2016
14 Aug 2016
14 Aug 2016
16 Aug 2016
14 Aug 2016
14 Aug 2016
14 Aug 2016
Incomplete
15 Aug 2016
15 Aug 2016
16 Aug 2016
17 Aug 2016
17 Aug 2016
19 Aug 2016

Place of
Interview

Gender

Age

Date Arrived
in SA

Central
Orange Farm
Park Station
Orange Farm
Diepsloot

F
M
M
M
M

40
46
35
39
25

2014/2015
2009
2008
2005
2009

Park Station
Central
Park Station
Diepsloot
Park Station
Central
Park Station

F
F
F
F
M
F
M

41
52
42
38
33
45
37

2006
2015
2014
2010
2005
2014
2005

Central
Central
Diepsloot
Diepsloot
Central
Orange Farm

M
F
M
M
31
47

33
23
40
22
F
F

2010
2012
2013
2013
2009
2007
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B. Cape Town

No.

Date of Interview

Place of
Interview

Gender

Age

Date Arrived
in SA

C1
C2
C3

07 Jul 2016
08 Jul 2016
09 Oct 2016

City Centre
Philippi
Masimphumelele

F
M
M

42
39
29

2011
2005
2007

C4
C5
C6
C7
C8
C9

09 Jul 2016
10 Jul 2016
11 Jul 2016
12 Jul 2016
07 Jul 2016
09 Oct 2016

City Centre
City Centre
Delft
City Centre
Du Noon
Masimphumelele

F
M
F
F
F
F

42
40
38
39
26
32

2006
2012
2005
2007
2015
2010

C10

09 Oct 2016

Masimphumelele

M

42

2008

C11
C12

10 Oct 2016
12 Oct 2016

City Centre
Masimphumelele

F
M

39
52

2010
2006

C13
C14

Incomplete
12 Oct 2016

Masimphumelele

F

28

2013

C15
C16
C17
C18
C19
C20

14 Oct 2016
14 Oct 2016
14 Oct 2016
14 Oct 2016
10 Jul 2016
15 Oct 2016

Du Noon
Du Noon
Du Noon
Du Noon
City Centre
Imizamo Yethu

M
M
M
M
F
M

46
48
34
48
48
36

2004
2007
2003
2007
2010
2005

B. Polokwane

No.

P1
P2
P3
P4
P5
P6
P7
P8
P9
P10

Date of Interview

08 Aug 2016
09 Aug 2016
11 Sep 2016
12 Aug 2016
13 Aug 20106
13 Aug 2016
11 Aug 2016
Incomplete
16 Aug 2016
18 Aug 2016

Place of
Interview

Gender

Age

Date Arrived
in SA

Polokwane
Polokwane
Polokwane
Polokwane
Greenside
Greenside
Greenside

F
M
F
M
M
M
M

25
44
46
48
39
33
39

2012
1992
2005
2006
2009
2010
2002

Savannah
CBD

M
M

40
32

2005
2012
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Annex B: Key Informant Interviews
Place of Interview

Organisation

Johannesburg

Zimbabwe Exiles Forum

Johannesburg

Zimbabwe Exiles Forum

Johannesburg

City of Johannesburg

Johannesburg

Amnesty International

Johannesburg

Methodist Church

Johannesburg

Consortium for Refugees and Migrants South
Africa (CoRMSA)

Johannesburg

University of Johannesburg

Pretoria

Legal Resources Centre

Pretoria

Department of Home Affairs

Pretoria

Lawyers for Human Rights

Pretoria

UNHCR

Pretoria

IOM – South Africa

Pretoria

ILO

Pretoria

EU Delegation

Cape Town

Africa Unite

Cape Town

Scalabrini Institute

Cape Town

Department of Home Affairs

Cape Town

Médecins Sans Frontières

Cape Town

Western Province

Cape Town

Institute for Justice and Reconciliation

Cape Town

South African Informal Traders Association

Cape Town

African Centre for Cities
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Cape Town

People Against Suffering, Oppression and
Poverty (PASSOP)

Harare

IOM – Zimbabwe

Harare

Union of Zimbabwe Journalists

Harare

Zimbabwe CBTA

Limpopo

South African Informal Traders Alliance

Limpopo

UNHCR

Limpopo

Somalian Association and Limpopo Refugee
Forum

Limpopo

Zimbabwean Community
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SOUTH AFRICA CASE STUDY

summary of project
In 2015, the European Union (EU) launched ‘Migrants in Countries in Crisis: Supporting an Evidence-based
Approach for Eﬀective and Cooperative State Action’, a four-year project implemented by the International
Centre for Migration Policy Development (ICMPD). This EU-funded project is a contribution to the global
Migrants in Countries in Crisis (MICIC) initiative, a government-led process co-chaired by the governments
of the Philippines and the United States, which shares similar goals. The project aims to improve the
capacity of states and other stakeholders to assist and provide protection to migrants who ﬁnd themselves
in countries aﬀected by crisis, as well as address the long-term implications of such situations. Within the
project, six regional consultations with states and other relevant stakeholders have been conducted,
contributing to the development of the MICIC initiative ‘Guidelines to protect migrants in countries experiencing conﬂict or natural disaster’, which provide guidance for states and other stakeholders in responding
to the needs of migrants caught in crisis situations. In addition, the project also develops capacity building
activities to follow up on key recommendations that have emerged over the course of the project. This
report presents one case study of the Research Component of the EU-funded MICIC project, whose goal is
to complement these eﬀorts by providing policy-relevant analysis of the implications of crises for host,
transit and origin countries.

